A dramatic day of high stakes diplomacy at the United Nations has exposed growing cracks in the transatlantic alliance since President Donald Trump returned to the global stage and massively shifted US foreign policy.
When Russia invaded Ukraine three years ago, Europe had no stronger partner than the United States.
But this week, in the halls of the General Assembly and at the Security Council, the US worked against its closest allies and sided with Russia, Belarus and North Korea to pass resolutions on the conflict in Ukraine.
To mark the third anniversary of Moscow's invasion, Ukraine sought a symbolic General Assembly resolution that would require the 193-member body to reaffirm Kyiv's territorial integrity and call for Russia to withdraw its forces in line with the UN charter.
That resolution did pass on Monday, but with less support than in past years. Many members abstained to avoid a tricky tension created by the US.
Washington's diplomats had urged other countries to vote against the measure and to instead support their "forward looking resolution" that was only three short paragraphs. It took a neutral stance on the war, without blaming Russia, and called for a swift end with a lasting peace to follow.
Washington not only introduced their measure in the General Assembly where every nation's vote is equal, but also in the more powerful Security Council. Resolutions there are legally binding - though sometimes hard to enforce - and there had never been council action on Ukraine because of Russia's veto power as a permanent member.
The move caught Europe off guard. One European diplomat told the BBC that the US behaved like a bully and did not take into account their stance on their continent's security.
Another who sits on the Security Council, Slovenia's ambassador Samuel Zbogar, told the BBC that Europe is struggling to adjust to the 180-degree change in the US position - and the speed at which Washington is moving.
He said the European Union will need to do some reflecting at the body's council meeting next week.
"Leaders will have to develop a plan on how the EU can actively be involved in finding peace, rather than reacting to what others are doing. It's up to us now in Europe to come forward," he told the BBC.
There were plenty of reactions in the halls of UN headquarters in New York, as European leaders worked to reconcile with the latest US position.
Introduction1. As a person who is actively involved in the current Myanmar peace process and serves as the Secretary of the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC), this article is written with intent to provide an understanding of the steps taken in the Myanmar’s peace journey, the current implementation and future processes, as well as the aspirations for peace in Myanmar.2. Peace researcher Johan Galtung defines peace as not only freedom from violence but also the resolution of other social problems for justice among people and promoting the full development of a country. Peace is a way for people to be free from war and fear, and to resolve differences between groups and communities, and to live in harmony with one another. Peace is also the fruit of the cessation of war. Peace is essential for every country and only peace can lead to national development, so peace is crucial.Peace efforts by successive governments3. After Myanmar gained independence from colonial rule, successive governments have made efforts to achieve peace by establishing policies and programs. Despite these efforts, peace remains distant for many reasons.4. After Myanmar gained independence in 1948, various domestic insurgent organizations emerged and began armed and covert insurgencies. While the Burmese military was strengthening and suppressing internal insurgencies, ethnic armed groups also escalated their violence. In 1948, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) began its insurgency, and in 1958, insurgent organizations such as the Shan State Liberation Army (SSA) and the Shan State Revolutionary Army (SURA) emerged. In 1959, the Karen National Union (KNU), Karenni National Progressive Party, New Mon State Party, and Chin Nationalist Front formed the National Democratic Unity Army (NDUA). The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) was formed in 1961. In 1970, the KNU moved to the Bago Yoma region in central Burma and, in collaboration with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Burma, increased its insurgency activities.5. The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) government issued an amnesty decree from 1955 to 1956. The government's position was announced in response to the three points that the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Burma, Than Htun, wanted to discuss for internal peace, as a peace offer to the communists in hiding. Prime Minister U Nu promulgated the Freedom of Education Act in 1958 by presidential decree. Under the Union government's internal peace plan, the People's Comrades Organization, the Pa-O National Liberation Front, and the Mon People's Front surrendered. The great architect of peace, Thakin Kodaw Hmaing, arranged for peace talks with the Communist Party of Burma, but it was unsuccessful due to disagreements.6. During the Caretaker Government (1958-1962), Caretaker Government leader General Ne Win said that a political solution would be found to achieve internal peace. Then, they worked to restore peace and stability in the community by uncovering and confiscating weapons caches across the country, dismantling ransom and robbery gangs around Yangon and Insein, disbanding dormitory units established by the ruling AFPLF factions, and integrating some of them into the Tatmadaw and military police. During the Caretaker Government, the armed communists in the jungle were cut off from the regions and districts due to the military offensive, and the members of the central committee and the regional committees lost confidence in the party leadership and became exposed. During the caretaker government, the insurgency decreased significantly due to the nationwide offensives against the insurgents.7. During the Revolutionary Council government (1962-1974), a general amnesty was declared in 1963 to invite insurgents who were practicing an armed path to join state-building activities with a new spirit. Under that decree, approximately 12,000 prisoners were granted amnesty. Many insurgents surrendered and entered the legal system, but some organizations, such as the Communist Party of Burma, refused to accept the general amnesty and called for dialogue. Therefore, the Revolutionary Council government offered peace talks and met with the insurgent organizations in peace talks, but the internal insurgency did not end completely and lasting peace was not achieved, and the insurgents continued to wage armed rebellion.8. After the Burma Socialist Programme Party government (1974-1988) took office, the government continued its efforts to achieve internal peace. The Communist Party of Burma offered peace talks in 1980, and negotiations with the government continued until 1981. However, the talks failed to materialize as the Communist Party of Burma demanded recognition as a separate armed group and recognition of their autonomous region based on the border region. In 1980, peace talks were held with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), but the KIA’s demand for a separate state for self-government and administration failed without agreement, as it was not permissible under the country’s constitution and for the sake of national unity and national sustainability.9. After the State Law and Order Restoration Council took power on September 18, 1988, it established and implemented (12) political, economic and social objectives along with its three core responsibilities. The government invited ethnic armed organizations fighting against the state to return to the legal framework. A plan was developed to transform ethnic armed organizations that had exchanged arms for peace into border guard forces and militia groups, as needed, allowing them to bear arms in accordance with the constitution. Between 1989 and 2007, 17 major ethnic armed organizations and 23 minor groups, realizing the genuine goodwill of the state and the Tatmadaw, entered the legal framework and achieved peace.10. In Myanmar’s history, elections were held under the 1947 Constitution and the 1974 Constitution. On May 9, 2008, the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar was ratified by a nationwide referendum. The Union Election Commission was established on March 11, 2010, to conduct elections in accordance with the Constitution (2008). On November 7, 2010, a multi-party democratic general election was held, and the Union Solidarity and Development Party won 388 out of 493 seats in the two houses of parliament and formed a government for the first term of parliament, led by President U Thein Sein.1st Democratic Government and the NCA11. During the First Democratic Government, President U Thein Sein invited ethnic armed organizations to peace talks in a statement (1/2011) on August 18, 2011. In order to conduct effective peace talks with ethnic armed organizations, the Union-level Peace Negotiation Team, the State-level Peace Negotiation Team, the Union Peacemaking Central Committee, the Union Peacemaking Committee, and the Myanmar Peace and Reconstruction Center were established. In addition, a national road map was established, consisting of three stages to achieve lasting peace. In addition, the Tatmadaw also issued six peace policies.12. While the government was making efforts for peace, ethnic armed organizations also formed groups to participate in the Myanmar peace process. On November 2, 2013, the National Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) was formed with 13 members at the National Conference of Ethnic Armed Organizations held in Laiza, Kachin State, and on June 2, 2015, the Senior Delegation (SD) was formed with 15 members at the Law Khila Conference held from June 2 to 9, 2015.13. During the first democratic government led by President U Thein Sein, on 15 October 2015, the Government and eight ethnic armed groups successfully signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in the presence of (21) domestic witnesses and (6) international witnesses, including the Special Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China for Asian Affairs, H.E. Mr. Sun Guoxiang, National Security Advisor of the Republic of India, H.E. Shri Ajit Kumar Doval, Special Representative of the Government of Japan for National Reconciliation in Myanmar, H.E. Mr. Yohei SASAKAWA, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, E. Mr. Apichart Chinwanno, Ambassador of the European Union to Myanmar, H.E. Mr. Roland Kobia, Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar, H.E. Mr. Vijay Nambiar. From the date of the initial call for peace until the finalization of the NCA on August 7, 2015, it took 1,450 days, during which no less than 5,000 small meetings and negotiations were held. The NCA is the highest-level peace agreement reached between the government, the military and ethnic armed organizations since independence.14. To continue implementing the provisions of the NCA, a Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) was held, the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) was formed to hold political dialogues, and the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC) was formed to monitor the ceasefire. To jointly coordinate and implement military matters outlined in the NCA, three levels were established: Union level (JMC-U), State level (JMC-S), and Regional level (JMC-L).15. The Union Peace Conference was held from January 12 to 16, 2016 at MICC-2 in Nay Pyi Taw. The five sectors agreed to be discussed in the framework of the political dialogue.2nd Democratic Government16. A multi-party democratic general election was held on November 8, 2015. In the three houses of parliament, 886 members were elected from the National League for Democracy, 117 from the Union Solidarity and Development Party, 40 from the Shan National League for Democracy, 45 from the Rakhine National Party, 1 from the National Unity Party, and 56 from other parties. The NLD was able to form a government and gain power in the second term of the parliament. During the Second Democratic Government, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) signed the NCA, and so the total number of 10 EAOs that have signed the NCA.17. The first session of the Union Peace Conference - (21) Century Panglong was held from August 31 to September 3, 2016 at MICC-2 in Nay Pyi Taw. The government, parliament, military, ethnic armed organizations, political parties, ethnic representative groups, and interested parties attended and submitted 72 proposals and some policy documents on their positions.18. The Union Peace Conference - (21) Century Panglong Second Session was held from 24 to 29 May 2017 at MICC-2 in Nay Pyi Taw. A total of (37) agreements were reached, including (12) agreements in the political sector, (11) agreements in the economic sector, (4) agreements in the social sector, and (10) agreements in the land and environment sector. These 37 agreements were signed as Part (1) of the Union Agreement, which was recorded as the first federal principle agreements in Myanmar’s political history.19. The third session of the Union Peace Conference - (21) Century Panglong was held at MICC-2 in Nay Pyi Taw from 11 to 16 July 2018 and resulted in the signing of Part 2 of the Union Agreement, which includes (4) basic agreements in the political sector, (1) basic agreement in the economic sector, (7) basic agreements in the social sector, and (2) basic agreements in the land and environment sector, totaling 14 agreements.20. The Fourth Session of the Union Peace Conference - (21) Century Panglong was held from 19 to 21 July 2020 at MICC-2 in Nay Pyi Taw and resulted in a total of 21 agreements, including (15) Framework Agreements on the Implementation of the NCA, (5) Guiding Principles on Union Building Based on Democracy and Federalism, and (2020) Phased Action Plans and Phased Implementations (Table 1). The Union Agreement was signed as Part (3) of the Union Agreement.21. During the Second Democratic Government, the priority given to constitutional amendments rather than continuing to implement peace has increased concerns among the EAOs that signed the NCA and slowed down the peace process. In parliament, the majority of the people's representatives who have taken legislative responsibilities have repealed important laws related to national security and the rule of law, and have taken action by winning votes in the Union Parliament on regional and state issues, which has led to a decline in the support of the ethnic people and a decrease in their trust in the government.22. In the 2020 multi-party democratic general election, illegal practices such as inflated voter lists, illegal inclusion of unauthorized persons on the voter list, illegal voting with extra ballots and illegal advance voting in neighborhoods and villages resulted in over 11 million voter fraud cases. The Tatmadaw repeatedly attempted to mediate the vote rigging issue, but its requests for mediation were rejected until midnight on January 31, 2021. In light of the political tensions caused by the vote-rigging, a state of emergency was declared and the Tatmadaw assumed state duties in accordance with the Constitution (2008). Peace Activities Under the State Administration Council23. In order to continuously implement the peace process, the State Administration Council has set the five priorities: “Priority will be given to achieving peace as the essence of the State and stabilizing the results of the peace process in alignment with the agreements in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) to extent possible.” In the political affairs, “To prioritize the arraignment of enduring peace for the entire nation in alignment with the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA),” and the NCA is being implemented with great care.24. The State Administration Council established three peace committees on 17- 2-2021, namely the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Central Committee (NSPCC), the Working Committee (NSPWC), and the Coordination Committee (NSPNC), to continue implementing the peace processes that have been carried out previously, the previous agreements with ethnic armed organizations, and the peace processes that are currently being discussed with them. These committees aim to effectively and successfully implement the national unity and peacemaking processes.25. The Chairman of the State Administration Council delivered a speech on peace to the ethnic armed groups and the people on 22-4-2022, designating 2022 as the Year of Peace and inviting them to meet with the leaders of the ethnic armed groups in person and have honest and open discussions to effectively implement peace issues. In response to the peace invitation, a total of 10 ethnic armed groups, including the 7 NCA signatories, namely the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC), the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), and the 3 NCA non-signatories, namely the United Wa State Party (UWSP), the National Democratic Alliance Army-Mong La (NDAA), and the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), came to Nay Pyi Taw to hold peace talks.26. In the meetings and discussions with 10 ethnic armed groups since May 2022, the demands of the ethnic armed groups, issues of amending the fundamental articles of the 2008 Constitution, and what is truly necessary, possible, and appropriate for the region and the country were discussed and negotiated openly and comprehensively, and the following four common agreements were reached, as well as agreements to amend and supplement important articles of the Constitution:Joint implementation to strengthen the multi-party democratic political system.Building a Union based on democracy and federalism, which are the desired goals of the entire ethnic people.Joint implementation for the peace and development of the Union.Cooperation for the rule of law, regional stability, and free and fair multi-party democratic elections.27. The National Solidarity and Peacemaking Coordinating Committee (NSPNC) which is the peace dialogue mechanism has been continuously engaging with relevant dialogue partners through informal meetings, virtual meetings, and formal meetings. During the tenure of the State Administration Council from February 2021 to February 2025, it held (89) meetings with ethnic armed organizations that have signed the NCA, (25) meetings with ethnic armed organizations that have not signed the NCA, (22) meetings with political parties, and (13) peacebuilding organizations, for a total of (149) meetings. Informal meetings and discussions are being held with ambassadors, chargés d'affaires, officials from international embassies in Myanmar, UN and EU organizations, and international individuals and organizations interested in Myanmar's peace process. Cooperation with international organizations28. NSPNC is coordinating with the relevant regional commands and state governments to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches conflict- affected areas and the local population, with the assistance of UN agencies, the Japan-based Nippon Foundation, and the ASEAN Coordination Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), under the umbrella of Technical Secretariat Center of Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC-TSC), in order to facilitate the return to normalcy of the peace process. Through this coordination, humanitarian assistance was provided to the local people in real need in townships in Kayah State, Karen State, Chin State, Mon State, Rakhine State, Southern Shan State, Sagaing Region, Tanintharyi Region, Bago Region, and Magway Region. Violent acts by opposing groups29. While the peace process was underway, on the other hand, unrest and subsequent violence began emerging from ordinary protests starting in March 2021. Eventually, the situation deteriorated into armed and violent attacks on the Government. Led by some extremist members of the NLD, they indoctrinated young people and formed terrorist groups so-called PDF. In addition to NCA-non-Signatories EAOs, some NCA-Signatories EAOs have also encouraged and provided military training to terrorist PDF groups. Those dissatisfied with the military's assumption of state power formed parallel governments in exile, such as the NUG and CRPH, and carried out various acts of violence through their PDF affiliates. In order to instill fear in the public, terrorists have brutally murdered civilians who disagree with them, accusing them of being “spies, informers, and traitors,” and based on the one-sided, extremist sectarian ideology of “anyone different from me is my enemy.” From February 1, 2021 to September 14, 2025, 868 ward administrators, 65 military veterans, 5556 civilians, 76 teachers, 17 health workers, 289 other employees, and religious persons, including 85 monks and 2 nuns, were violently murdered. In addition, PDF terrorists carried out a total of (11,253) bombings and arson attacks on non-military civilian targets, including (1,495) security checkpoints, (1,433) urban buildings, (683) educational buildings, (1,667) road and bridge explosions, and (568) towers. In addition, there have been clashes in Kachin State, Shan State (Northern), Kayin State, Rakhine State, Chin State, and the upper Sagaing Region, threatening the sovereignty of the country.The State Administration Council's invitation for Peace Talks30. In order to ensure the stability of internal peace and the results of peace process, the Chairman of the State Administration Council, at special events and Union Government meetings, has always emphasized that the problems faced by society can only be solved through democratic means such as dialogue and negotiation. Demanding demands through armed violence is the wrong path, and success can only be achieved through dialogue, negotiation and political means. The door to peace is always open to resolve political issues through political means in order to end armed conflicts and create a peaceful and stable environment. Only dialogue can bring stability and improve the economic and social conditions of the people. The Tatmadaw, with a genuine desire for the development of the country, declared unilateral ceasefires (20) times from 21-12-2018 to 31-12-2022, and made efforts to build trust and peace with ethnic armed organizations.31. The State Administration Council government, aiming to achieve the lasting peace that the entire country has been longing for, designated 2022 as the Year of Peace, and on April 22, 2022, the Chairman of the State Administration Council personally invited all ethnic armed organizations to meet and discuss. On September 26, 2024, the State Administration Council announced through state-owned media that it would invite ethnic armed organizations, terrorist organizations, and terrorist PDF groups fighting against the state to abandon the path of armed and terrorist attacks and engage in political dialogue to resolve political issues through political means, whether through party politics or through elections, in order to work together with the people to achieve lasting peace and development.32. Armed conflicts remain a challenge. Ethnic armed groups need to prioritize the interests of the Union and all ethnic people over their own interests. No society would accept such a course of armed violence, and we all need to oppose it. Only dialogue can bring stability and peace and improve the socio-economic lives of the people. It is necessary to pay special attention to the losses and damages caused to the country due to armed conflict and terrorist acts. Therefore, the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee always welcomes the door of peace to be opened to negotiate and hold peace talks to resolve political issues through political means. Dialogue Process33. A careful analysis of the government's invitations to peace talks and the preconditions for talks set by some opposing groups clearly shows a loss of trust between the Tatmadaw and the ethnic armed organizations. The key to returning to the path of peace is rebuilding this trust. Despite the government's invitation to come to the peace table, opposition groups view the invitation as a sign that the military is weak and are eager to continue fighting.34. The process of negotiation is often initiated when parties to a conflict consider that other means of resolution are impractical or impossible, or when both parties realize that a negotiated solution can be found. Particularly, once both sides recognize that neither can achieve a decisive military advantage, they are more likely to seek a negotiated solution. However, when such a situation arises, significant loss of many human resources and infrastructure have already been faced.Myanmar and the election35. Since the State Administration Council assumed its responsibilities in 2021, the five-point roadmap has announced to the public which will implement during their tenure. As in the five-point roadmap, upon accomplishing the provisions of the state of emergency, free and fair multi-party democratic elections will be held in line with the 2008 Constitution, to ensure accuracy and fairness in the general election to prevent eligible voters from losing their rights, and further work will be undertaken to hand over State duties to the elected government in accordance with democratic standards.36. The State Administration Council is making every effort to successfully hold a fair and dignified multi-party democratic general election, free from all forms of injustice such as intimidation, coercion, arbitrary incitement, and group influence. The State Administration Council is working towards holding the election by the end of 2025. Nationwide peace and stability remain essential for conducting a free, fair, and credible general election. A significant positive move on the peace journey will undoubtedly be made by the collective efforts of the government, military, EAOs, stakeholders, and the entire public working together to end the violence and to ensure stability and peace, a critical step toward a successful general election.Conclusion37. NSPNC is committed to identifying pathways for the continued implementation of Myanmar’s peace process and believe that the post-election situation will be provided a good opportunity for the Myanmar’s peace journey. Taking advantage of this opportunity, NSPNC is carefully assessing the necessary steps to develop a peace platform in order to successfully implement its target.38. Due to the conflicts, stability, rule of law, and security have deteriorated, forcing civilians to endure daily life filled with anxiety and fear. To overcome these crises, comprehensive efforts need to be made in various ways. In order to reduce the Myanmar's current military, political and economic conflicts, all-inclusive collaboration between the government, military, EAOs, civil service, and public is required. And all citizens must work together to drive meaningful conflict transformation and resolution processes in the country.NSPNC
Diplomatic relations between Myanmar and China have reached their diamond jubilee anniversary on 8 June 2025. The state-level grand celebration of the 75th anniversary of the Myanmar-China diplomatic tie was held in Nay Pyi Taw yesterday.Bound by history, Myanmar and China have been sharing the intertwined fates with fraternal ties since prehistoric times.The most ancient tie between the two countries was evidenced as early as 4 BC; there was a trade route linking China’s Sichuan and Yunnan provinces with Myanmar. Again, in the Chinese Tang Dynasty from 618-907 AD, a team of musicians and dancers from Myanmar’s Pyu Dynasty visited the capital of the Chinese Tang Dynasty and exchanged cultures. The very first Myanmar diplomat to China can be traced back to Myanmar’s Bagan Dynasty in the 12th century when the Venerable Sayadaw Shin Ditha Pamauk arrived in Beijing for negotiations, which concluded as a success story of an ancient diplomatic milestone between the two countries with mutual respect and understanding.Sharing the geographical origins of mountains, hills and rivers, the two countries experienced similar historical paths, particularly in World War II when the world stood against fascism eighty years ago. While Russia (former Soviet Union) fought Nazi Germany together with its allies in the European frontline, Myanmar and China fought the Japanese fascists in the Asian frontline respectively. Historical records estimate that around 20 million Chinese sacrificed their lives and souls in the battles resisting the Japanese aggression, while Myanmar lost at least one million citizens in the struggle to expel Japanese fascist forces.Myanmar and China established a strategic partnership as early as in fighting back the Japanese invasions, notably through the construction of the Yunnan-Myanmar Road, connecting Kunming in China’s Yunnan Province and Lashio in Myanmar’s Shan State. This vital route played a crucial role in the supply chain for China in resisting Japanese aggression. Chinese forces provided reciprocal support to the Myanmar Army in combatting Japanese invaders, especially in the frontline in northern Myanmar and the southern part of China. More than just neighbouring countries, Myanmar and China stood as allies in defending their sovereignty against foreign invasion. This reflects their Swe Myo Pauk Phaw spirit in the shared struggle against colonialism during the 1940s.Accordingly, since World War II, Myanmar and China have already developed the groundwork for a “Community of Common Destiny for Mankind” or a “Shared Future” through their efforts.The sense of a shared future and shared interests reflects togetherness on the road to building peace, development and prosperity, which will be shared among each other by recognizing differences and diversities with mutual respect and trust.Today, the world is reshaping the international order toward a global environment with peace, justice and equality which guarantees for non-hegemonic arena; the People’s Republic of China is one of the steering nations in this mechanism guided by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, of which, both Myanmar and China were pioneering signatories dating back in 1954.What is more, Myanmar was the first non-communist country that recognized the new China after its founding of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949. Furthermore, Myanmar is the very first neighbouring country to China that peacefully agreed to finalize the bilateral border demarcation; and the two countries have never ever had any disputes over their shared boundary ownership.Under the Swe Myo Pauk-Phaw (fraternal) tie, Myanmar and China uphold mutual support in the international diplomatic realm. As an all-weather friend of China, Myanmar consistently supports the ‘One China’ policy and firmly rejects any acts of aggression against China carried out from Myanmar territory. Reciprocally, China has persistently maintained its steadfast diplomatic support to Myanmar on the international stage in every successive era.However, without a doubt, the threats posed by neocolonialism have repeatedly sought to weaken this deep-rooted solidarity between the two Asian nations, which have been sharing affection for thousands of years with mutual respect. Both countries, Myanmar and China, firmly reject hegemonism, any attempts to distabilize the region, and neocolonial interference in any disguise, standing together in unity and supporting each other through every challenge.The concept of a shared future and shared interests for a common destiny are the core values that should be vested in the global trend of multipolarity. The two leaders, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing of Myanmar and President Xi Jinping of the PRC jointly upheld the United Nationscentered international system and the international order underpinned by international law and safeguarded the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries when they met in Moscow in early May at the sideline of the Grand Celebration of 80th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. Their meeting reached an important consensus on building the Myanmar-China community with a shared future.Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and President Xi Jinping exchanged congratulatory messages on the occasion of the diamond jubilee anniversary of the bilateral tie on Sunday.Senior General Min Aung Hlaing emphasized that the longstanding “Pauk-Phaw” friendship, which was cultivated by successive generations of leadership, has continued to grow stronger over time. In 2011, this enduring relationship was elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership. President Xi Jinping’s historic visit to Myanmar in 2020 marked a new chapter in bilateral relations, during which both nations reaffirmed their commitment to building a Myanmar-China community with a shared future.In return, Chinese President Xi Jinping also highlighted in his congratulations that the friendship between Myanmar and China has stood the test of time and grown even stronger, adding that upholding the jointly advocated Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Bandung Spirit, the two countries have been committed to good neighbourliness, deepened mutually beneficial cooperation, and firmly supported each other on issues regarding their respective core interests and major concerns, setting a fine example of friendly exchange between countries.China, as a rising power with strong economic and political unity, having a highly esteemed cultural status, consistently shares weals and woes in multi-faceted issues. China’s vast and immediate assistance in the recent major earthquake in Myanmar deserves earnest recognition as a milestone in the humanitarian efforts in Myanmar. The people of Myanmar always express our heart-touched gratitude to the government and the people of China for their timely and generous humanitarian assistance in earthquake management. What is more, it is our sincere appreciation to China for its unwavering support in Myanmar’s efforts to achieve long-lasting peace and stability, national reconciliation, and socioeconomic development.The enduring ties between Myanmar and China bearing the Pauk Phaw spirit will stand lasting over to our future generations and descendants for the next thousands of years with resilient love.Source: The Global New Light of Myanmar
In modern conflict zones, proposals for "humanitarian corridors" are often introduced as emergency mechanisms for delivering aid to civilians caught in crossfires. On paper, the concept appears benevolent and necessary: create temporary access routes through embattled or inaccessible regions, allowing food, medicine, and emergency supplies to reach vulnerable populations. However, beneath the humanitarian impulse lies a complex web of legal, political, and security vulnerabilities, especially when such corridors traverse territories controlled by non-state armed actors.Undermining Sovereignty: The Legal DilemmaThe foundation of international relations is built on the principle of state sovereignty. Enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and reaffirmed by instruments such as the Declaration on Principles of International Law (1970) and customary international law, this principle affirms that each state has the exclusive right to control its internal affairs and territorial integrity without external interference.Humanitarian corridors that bypass the central government and engage with non-state actors challenge this principle. When aid operations are coordinated with entities that do not hold recognized sovereignty, such actions can amount to de facto legitimization of parallel governance structures. This poses a dangerous precedent: legitimizing governance by force, rather than by law or democratic process.According to International Humanitarian Law (IHL), particularly under the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, humanitarian access must be consented to by the state party concerned. Article 70(1) of Additional Protocol I states that relief actions "shall be undertaken subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned." In non-international armed conflicts, which fall under Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, humanitarian operations still require state consent, unless the Security Council authorizes otherwise under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.Thus, from a legal perspective, humanitarian corridors established without the consent of the host state or a clear UN mandate may be illegitimate. They risk violating the principle of non-intervention and may be interpreted as an infringement on state sovereignty, potentially amounting to an internationally wrongful act.The Philadelphi Corridor: A Warning from the Middle EastThe so-called Philadelphi Corridor provides a real-world cautionary tale. Situated along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, this narrow strip was initially created under the Oslo Accords to serve as a buffer zone for monitoring arms smuggling and providing a humanitarian lifeline to Gaza.Despite this objective, the corridor was quickly co-opted by Hamas, a designated terrorist organization in many countries, which used it as a conduit for smuggling weapons, ammunition, and military supplies into Gaza. Tunnels were dug beneath the corridor, enabling the steady flow of contraband. What was meant to be a route for humanitarian relief morphed into a strategic asset for militant actors, fueling violence in the region.Eventually, citing national security concerns, Israel seized control of the corridor and announced it would never relinquish it again. This episode illustrates how humanitarian mechanisms, when not robustly governed, can directly compromise the security of neighboring states and prolong violent conflict.The case also underscores a core principle of International Humanitarian Law: humanitarian aid must be neutral, impartial, and independent. When these principles are not observed, corridors can be repurposed for strategic advantage. The abuse of humanitarian access undermines not only security, but also the legitimacy of humanitarian norms.Security Vulnerabilities in Fragile RegionsIn regions where central authority is weak or contested, the establishment of humanitarian corridors poses a range of security risks:Weapons and Narcotics Smuggling: Corridors passing through areas outside government control can become unmonitored pathways for illicit activities.Terrorist Infiltration: Unregulated access can enable the movement of extremist fighters across borders or conflict lines.Empowerment of Illicit Actors: By providing access to resources and international legitimacy, corridors can embolden non-state actors and entrench their control over territory.Security guarantees in such regions are difficult to enforce. Unlike the Philadelphi Corridor, where Egypt and Qatar attempted (unsuccessfully) to provide monitoring forces, many conflict zones lack reliable third-party security providers. Who takes responsibility if the corridor is hijacked? Who ensures neutrality, safety, and the exclusive delivery of aid?Furthermore, the financial burden of establishing and maintaining such corridors is immense. International organizations, including the United Nations, are often already overstretched. Meanwhile, donor fatigue and shifting geopolitical priorities limit the capacity of major powers to fund and secure such operations. Without robust oversight and sustained support, the risk of abuse becomes all but certain.Moral Hazard and Political LiabilityA less discussed but equally important issue is moral hazard. If international actors sidestep state authority to deliver aid, they may unintentionally incentivize armed groups to seize territory, knowing that humanitarian support will follow. This creates a perverse cycle: the more territory they control, the more likely they are to gain de facto recognition and access to resources.Should weapons or contraband be smuggled through these corridors, neighboring states and international agencies that facilitated them could be held partially responsible. In a world increasingly governed by legal norms, liability does not stop at borders.According to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), states may bear responsibility for aid programs that cause harm if they knowingly contribute to violations of international obligations. If aid leads to unintended consequences like arming militants or destabilizing neighboring regions, those involved may face not just political fallout but also legal scrutiny.The Path Forward: Upholding Law and SovereigntyThe urgency of humanitarian need should not blind policymakers to the long-term strategic consequences of their decisions. Aid must be delivered in a manner that respects national sovereignty, supports the rule of law, and does not enable or legitimize actors who operate outside international norms.In short, humanitarianism must not be weaponized. The international community has a responsibility to ensure that aid does not become a tool of conflict, but rather a bridge to peace. The experience of the Philadelphi Corridor is not just a warning—it is a blueprint of how good intentions can be hijacked without firm adherence to international law.References;United Nations Charter, Article 2(4)https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-textDeclaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (UNGA Resolution 2625, 1970)https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_2625/ga_2625_ph_e.pdfGeneva Conventions (1949) and Additional Protocols (1977)https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treatiesArticle 70, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions(On relief actions and required state consent)https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-70Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventionshttps://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gc-1949-1/article-3Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001)https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdfUN Security Council Resolution 2165 (2014) – Authorizing cross-border humanitarian aid in Syria/ https://undocs.org/S/RES/2165(2014)UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – Guidelines on humanitarian access/ https://www.unocha.org/Sassòli, Marco. International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019.Fleck, Dieter (Ed.). The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law. Oxford University Press, 2013.Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict (PILAC)https://pilac.law.harvard.edu/ICRC Commentaries on International Humanitarian Lawhttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/humanitarian-access-and-lawByman, Daniel. A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. Oxford University Press, 2011.Rubin, Barry. The Truth About Syria. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.BBC News – Gaza smuggling tunnels: The life beneath (on Philadelphi tunnels)https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11098259Council on Foreign Relations – Hamas and Gaza’s Tunnelshttps://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hamas-and-gazas-tunnels
Despite Donald Trump’s fraying popularity at home, there is a corner of the globe where his brand remains remarkably resilient: Eastern Europe. Last Sunday, the Trump-loving far-right populist George Simion topped the first round of Romania’s presidential elections, securing over 40 percent of the vote and a realistic path to the top office. Echoing Trump’s pledge to “Make America Great Again,” Simion promises to “give back to the Romanian people what was taken from them”. He is not an outlier.In neighbouring Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban openly embraces the mantle of Trump’s European standard-bearer. Trumpworld’s influence in the region extends beyond politics. Jared Kushner is spearheading a real estate venture in downtown Belgrade, and Donald Trump Jr has recently completed his second tour in months of Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria, rubbing shoulders with politicians, business elites and crypto entrepreneurs eager to forge ties with the Trump family.Eastern Europe’s fascination with the “America First” president is fuelled by both ideological alignment and hard-nosed pragmatism. The MAGA message resonates widely across the post-communist landscape. A recent Gallup poll ahead of the 2024 United States election showed that 49 percent of respondents in Bulgaria and Hungary – and a staggering 59 percent in Serbia – preferred Trump over Kamala Harris. This is no coincidence. From the AfD supporters in former East Germany to the ruling Georgian Dream party in Tbilisi, illiberal actors across the region are rallying against the liberal democratic consensus. Their views on issues like LGBTQ rights, race, gender, multiculturalism, vaccines and Ukraine mirror those of Trump’s base. Trump’s friendliness towards Vladimir Putin has further enhanced his appeal in Russia-friendly nations like Serbia.There is also a transnational dimension. Eastern European diasporas in the US tend to favour Trump, drawn by social conservatism or competition with other ethnic and racial groups. Their counterparts in Western Europe are similarly inclined, even as they benefit from the very open-border policies they often deride. In Romania’s recent election, 60 percent of Romanians living in the European Union and the United Kingdom voted for Simion. Many had previously backed Calin Georgescu, a far-right figure publicly defended by US Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference.At home, elites see in Trump a potential enabler. A powerful friend in Washington who overlooks corruption and democratic backsliding could prove advantageous both domestically and internationally. The prospect of US foreign policy becoming indistinguishable from the Trump Organization’s business agenda is attractive in a region rife with opaque sectors like infrastructure, energy and mining. The recent US-Ukraine critical minerals deal is seen as a blueprint for currying favour with a transactional White House.This relationship is already yielding dividends. In April, the Trump administration reversed sanctions on Antal Rogan, a close Orban ally, originally imposed under the Global Magnitsky Act by the Biden administration. The move has raised hopes elsewhere: in Bulgaria, tycoon and political heavyweight Delyan Peevski – also sanctioned under Magnitsky – is reportedly eyeing a similar reprieve.Yet Eastern Europe’s Trump infatuation may prove fragile. Ironically, Trump’s economic nationalism threatens to undercut the very economies governed by his ideological allies. Hungary and Slovakia, both heavily reliant on automotive exports, stand to suffer under US tariffs. Slovakia’s car industry alone accounts for nearly 30 percent of national exports and employs 10 percent of the workforce. Even a modest 10 percent tariff could decimate jobs in Central Europe’s industrial belt.Such economic fallout would have political consequences. In the Czech Republic, it might boost populist Andrej Babis, a Trump-like businessman. But in Hungary, Orban already faces a serious challenge from Peter Magyar, with elections looming next year. In Slovakia, Robert Fico governs with a slim majority and increasing public dissent – his long-term survival is uncertain.Trumpism has already proven a liability for right-wing allies in Canada and Australia. While Eastern Europe remains more receptive, the region is not immune to the risks of over-identification with a movement that pits itself against the European Union, liberal values and global economic integration.The MAGA revolution may still fire up crowds in Bucharest and Belgrade – but its contradictions could just as easily burn those who embrace it.Source - https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2025/5/7/eastern-europe-bets-on-trump-but-at-what-cost
“Salute to the Houthis!” This nationalist cheering appeared across Chinese social media as Western commercial vessels ran a gauntlet of drone and missile attacks in the Red Sea against ships they claimed were traveling to Israel. Meanwhile, ships marked “Chinese Vessel & Crew” sail through these same waters relatively untouched. It’s not a coincidence. Maritime tracking data now confirms what Houthi officials have been openly sharing: Chinese ships receive special treatment in a conflict zone that has become a crucible of hostility toward US interests.This preferential treatment is no accident, but rather the result of careful diplomatic choreography. Recent US Treasury sanctions reveal that Houthi leaders, including Mohamed Ali al-Houthi of the Supreme Political Council, coordinated directly with Chinese officials to guarantee their vessels would not be targeted. This informal pact was formalized during diplomatic talks in Oman, culminating in explicit safe passage guarantees, even as drone and missile strikes against US and other Western shipping escalated. While Houthi officials publicly claim to discriminate between Western and Chinese vessels, their targeting systems remain rudimentary and prone to error, occasionally resulting in mistaken attacks on Chinese ships traversing the narrow Bab el-Mandeb strait, but have shown progress in improving their accuracy, thanks to Chinese technology. For Beijing, its real battle starts on the economic front via the Islamic Republic proxies, where control of vital maritime corridors potentially yields greater advantages than any negotiated trade agreement.This strategic calculation is reflected in China’s official messaging. Xinhua News Agency portrays the crisis as revealing “United States’ impotence” against “non-traditional opponents like the Houthis” while claiming US military intervention has “only triggered more resistance” and exposed “the decline of US economic influence and the gradual disintegration of its alliance system.” Behind this rhetoric lies a clear economic imperative: transit the Red Sea. For Beijing, preserving freedom of movement in this corridor is non-negotiable. While overall shipping traffic through the Red Sea has plunged by nearly 70 percent since attacks began, the proportion of China-linked tonnage has surged, a silent testament to the effectiveness of the arrangement.The impact on European economies has been severe. Major European shipping companies have been forced to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. This creates an artificial competitive advantage for Chinese goods, which continue to flow unimpeded through the Red Sea corridor while European competitors face delays and higher expenses. German and French manufacturers are already reporting supply chain disruptions and lost market share to Chinese competitors, a tangible economic victory for Beijing, which was achieved primarily through proxy conflict rather than direct trade competition with the United States.This arrangement goes beyond short-term tactical cooperation. US sanctions against Chinese satellite and shipping firms provide evidence that Beijing’s technological and logistical support has strengthened Houthi capabilities and created advantages for Chinese maritime interests. Multiple Chinese companies, including Shenzhen Boyu Imports and Exports among others, have been sanctioned for supplying dual-use components that bolster the Houthis’ missile and UAV capabilities. Beijing may not be firing missiles, but it supplies the parts, the software, and the satellite eyes that help aim them.China’s technological and diplomatic support networkIn April 2025, the United States sanctioned Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co. Ltd. (CGSTL) for providing satellite imagery to Yemen’s Houthis that enabled precise strikes on US naval assets in the Red Sea. CGSTL had previously been sanctioned in 2023 for providing battlefield intelligence during its military operations in Ukraine, establishing a pattern of the company acting as a de facto intelligence asset for US adversaries. But CGSTL is no ordinary company, embedded within the Chinese Academy of Sciences and backed by Jilin’s provincial government, it exemplifies China’s military-civil fusion policy, functioning more as an extension of Beijing’s intelligence apparatus than an independent enterprise. Despite Washington’s repeated warnings, Beijing has maintained a posture of strategic denial: providing the tools of war while feigning neutrality and taking no visible corrective action.The technology pipeline from China to the Houthi forces represents a sophisticated approach to proxy warfare. The New York Times documented Chinese-origin hydrogen fuel cells recovered from Houthi drones used in shipping attacks, which extended flight range and reduced detectability. Perhaps most damning was the interception of 800 drone propellers with Chinese identifiers at the Omani border, the same model identified in UAVs used by the Houthis, Iranian-aligned militias in Iraq, and Russian-backed forces in Ukraine. Rather than shipping complete weapons systems, China exports the critical components, guidance modules, propulsion systems, and power supplies, allowing non-state actors to wage asymmetric warfare while Beijing maintains plausible deniability through intermediaries like online vendors operating through Chinese e-commerce platforms.Iran gains leverage, China gains reachChina’s support for Iran strategically allows Beijing to reach its objectives without direct involvement or accountability. In January 2025, two Iranian ships carried over one thousand tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port, an essential ingredient for solid missile fuel. That’s enough to manufacture around 260 medium-range missiles. While China has supplied missile technology to Iran for decades, the scale and visibility of these shipments signal a strategic expansion in the partnership despite China’s denial of involvement. The implications ripple across the region. As Iran’s missile program grows, so does its capacity to arm and sustain proxy groups like the Houthis in Yemen. These groups don’t need long-range missiles; they need enhanced UAVs, better targeting systems, and reliable supply chains, all of which have visibly improved. China doesn’t have to arm the Houthis directly. Strengthening Iran enables a regional network that quietly serves Chinese interests by keeping the United States entangled in costly, low-return conflicts.The quiet alignment between Beijing and Tehran came into sharper focus on April 26, 2025, when a large explosion hit the Bandar Abbas port. While Iranian officials denied importing missile fuel, private security company Ambrey confirmed the port had received these chemicals from China in March. Around the same time as the satellite company sanctions, Washington also targeted companies involved with the Tinos I, a Panama-flagged tanker that secretly carried Iranian oil to China. This operation was backed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, creating a two-way street: Iran gets money for its oil, and China gets both fuel and influence. China’s strategic ambiguity and dual narrativeBeijing has perfected a two-track approach to the Red Sea crisis. Publicly, Chinese officials initially avoided condemning Houthi attacks, instead calling vaguely for “relevant parties” to play “constructive” roles in maintaining stability. Only as international pressure mounted did China’s United Nations representatives acknowledge Houthi disruption of trade, while Chinese vessels continued receiving preferential treatment through Houthi waters.This calculated ambiguity extends to social media, where Chinese users openly celebrate Houthi attacks on Western interests, with one boldly stating: “I want to see news of American and British warships being blown up,” sentiments mirroring earlier support for forces opposing Western interests in Ukraine and Gaza.China’s approach is strategically precise: Beijing doesn’t want Houthi forces to either triumph completely or collapse. It needs them to be active and disruptive, just enough to keep US naval resources tied up while Chinese ships sail through relatively unimpeded. Every Houthi missile that doesn’t target a Chinese vessel becomes a tax on American presence, a stress test for global shipping, and a demonstration of how much disruption Western powers can absorb before retreating or escalating.The Russia-China-Iran nexusThis alignment is now formalized through strategic coordination. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s strategic visits to Moscow and Beijing ahead of each US negotiation round in April 2025 reveal a deliberate synchronization of diplomatic positions. Their March 2025 trilateral talks in Beijing produced a unified stance against Western pressure, with China proposing alternatives directly challenging US positions.Beyond diplomacy, Russia could potentially take custody of Iran’s highly-enriched uranium in future deals, providing technical cover for Iran’s nuclear program. Meanwhile, Chinese firms supply the dual-use technologies empowering Iran’s proxies, including the Houthis. The same drone components documented in Houthi arsenals have appeared in Ukraine, following an identical playbook of low-cost attrition, proxy warfare, and Western hesitation.This alliance continues to deepen, as evidenced by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent twenty-year strategic partnership with Iran in April 2025. While China supplies technology and Iran manages proxies, Russia provides diplomatic cover and international legitimacy, creating a sophisticated system for reshaping regional power dynamics without direct confrontation, while securing preferential maritime passage for Chinese vessels.Business first, influence followsBeijing’s approach to the Houthis represents calculated and deliberate statecraft, not opportunistic coincidence. The Houthi movement now operates with Chinese satellite technology that they could never independently develop, and launches strikes using guidance systems built from Chinese electronics. Washington can sanction individual companies, but unless it confronts the triangulated relationship between China, Iran, and regional proxies, it will always be playing catch-up as Chinese vessels continue to navigate contested waters with relative security.If Washington truly wants to win its economic competition with China, it should focus less on tariffs and more on territorial contestation, pushing China out of strategic regions like the Red Sea, where physical presence, not paper restrictions, determines the future of markets. This requires building stronger strategic relationships with European allies, who are being courted now by China against the United States, who are suffering the economic consequences of this crisis, and who have shared interests in preserving free navigation through vital maritime corridors.Equally important is engaging with the Yemeni people themselves, who are tired of being manipulated by international powers and feel unheard in discussions about their country’s future. Any sustainable solution must address their legitimate grievances rather than treating Yemen merely as a venue for great power competition.Ultimately, Washington must understand that Yemen is no longer a peripheral conflict. It is a live demonstration of how China converts commercial access into strategic leverage, curating conflict, denying responsibility, and watching as US power is bled by a thousand proxy cuts. Meanwhile, while American policymakers debate whether the Houthis are even worth worrying about, Beijing is busy carving safe lanes for its ships and weaponizing instability to tilt global trade in its favor. And as Chinese netizens jubilantly salute the Houthis online, Beijing’s calculated gambit in the Red Sea will continue to yield dividends that no trade negotiation could ever deliver.Source : https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/how-china-turned-the-red-sea-into-a-strategic-trap-for-the-us/
We already understand that the world’s superpowers are adept at managing the shifting global order and international systems. However, as residents of medium-sized countries with limited interest in politics and political systems, we often overlook the significant influence and control that powerful nations have on the world.Nevertheless, since the strategic decisions of these superpowers can profoundly affect medium countries, it is essential for us to constantly monitor the evolving world order and adopt strategies that allow us to adapt to it.In this regard, Myanmar has taken steps to prepare for the emerging trends in the dynamic world order. Myanmar recently hosted the “Forum on Myanmar Beyond 2025: Challenges and Opportunities in a Multipolar World,” inviting international experts in geoeconomics and geopolitics, officials from political parties, and both local and foreign specialists.According to Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin, who contributed a video discussion to the forum, multipolarity is not merely a continuation of the unipolar or bipolar systems. It is a new world order that involves multiple poles of power, surpassing the simplicity of the previous structures. Unlike the previous systems, multipolarity is not defined by rivalry among nation-states but by competition between civilization-states. Therefore, multipolarity arises from rivalries between rich civilization-states. These states, which extend beyond national boundaries, hold significant power. In the modern world, there are roughly four major civilization-states: the global West, China, Russia, and India. Among them, the three are technically countries, their rich cultures, rituals, identities and unique characteristics position them as more than just nation-states.Thus, we are witnessing the emergence of a multipolar world, and the globalist agenda of a unipolar world is becoming a thing of the past. This shift provides an opportunity for all regions to regain and consolidate their sovereignty. Myanmar needs to seize this opportunity and act swiftly to strengthen its autonomy. With rising global dynamics, this is a critical moment for Myanmar to assert its position on the world stage and shape its future free from external pressures. By embracing this transition, Myanmar could create a more balanced and resilient political and economic environment.The Chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC), Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, emphasized Myanmar’s geographical importance during his speech at the forum, noting that “Our country is a long country stretching from north to south. In addition to abundant freshwater rivers, the country has a diverse climate, forests, and a variety of natural resources, including fruit trees. These are our country's opportunities and advantages. Our country has a coastline of over 1,300 miles, and deep-sea ports and economic zones are operating. Our country is located in a geographically central location for maritime trade.”Myanmar must leverage its unique characteristics and cultural identity to balance the interests of neighbouring powers, given its position between two powerful countries. As the SAC Chairman pointed out at the forum, “Our country is surrounded by five neighbouring countries and is located between the most populous nations, China and India. It sits on the communication route between South Asia and Southeast Asia, making it a pivot area. The combined population of Myanmar’s neighbouring countries is nearly four billion, or about 50 percent of the world’s population. This presents a strong market for products produced by Myanmar.”Among neighbouring countries, China recognizes Myanmar's geopolitical significance as a bridge to the Indian Ocean. The Kyaukphyu port, in particular, is of strategic interest to China. Furthermore, China aims to control the Myanmar corridor to benefit its landlocked western provinces and reduce its dependency on the narrow Malacca Strait for sea trade with the West, as well as for fuel imports from the Middle East. Additionally, Myanmar presents a growing market for Chinese commodities and has the potential to be a key source of timber and gems.Myanmar also plays a vital role in India’s “Act East” and “Neighborhood First” policies. The Indian Army has long relied on the policy of “constructive engagement” to conduct joint military operations with Myanmar, primarily aimed at combating extremism in the North-East. This cooperation helps the Tatmadaw contain Myanmar's ethnic insurgencies. Moreover, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport project, a cornerstone of India’s Act East Policy, aims to provide an alternate outlet for the Indian landlocked northeast.Although Russia is not a direct neighbour, its longstanding friendship with Myanmar has led to significant economic and strategic investments, such as the Dawei deep-sea port project, which is set to resume with Russian investment. Furthermore, whenever Myanmar encounters any difficulties, it has always provided assistance, and in the video message sent to this forum by Alexander Dugin, Russia has also pledged its readiness to provide assistance.To recap, Myanmar's strategic location, positioned between these three potential multipolar powers, is an opportunity in the dynamic world order. Myanmar finds itself at a crucial juncture in the evolving global order. However, this potential must be carefully navigated.That said, Myanmar faces significant internal challenges. Since its independence, the country has grappled with persistent internal conflicts that remain unresolved to this day. These conflicts hinder Myanmar’s development and its ability to fully capitalize on the opportunities presented by the changing global order. Without resolving these issues, Myanmar may struggle to chart its own path in the emerging multipolar world. Only through careful navigation of both internal and external dynamics can Myanmar hope to capitalize on the emerging world order and secure a prosperous and resilient future.
