Despite Donald Trump’s fraying popularity at home, there is a corner of the globe where his brand remains remarkably resilient: Eastern Europe. Last Sunday, the Trump-loving far-right populist George Simion topped the first round of Romania’s presidential elections, securing over 40 percent of the vote and a realistic path to the top office. Echoing Trump’s pledge to “Make America Great Again,” Simion promises to “give back to the Romanian people what was taken from them”. He is not an outlier.
In neighbouring Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban openly embraces the mantle of Trump’s European standard-bearer. Trumpworld’s influence in the region extends beyond politics. Jared Kushner is spearheading a real estate venture in downtown Belgrade, and Donald Trump Jr has recently completed his second tour in months of Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria, rubbing shoulders with politicians, business elites and crypto entrepreneurs eager to forge ties with the Trump family.
Eastern Europe’s fascination with the “America First” president is fuelled by both ideological alignment and hard-nosed pragmatism. The MAGA message resonates widely across the post-communist landscape. A recent Gallup poll ahead of the 2024 United States election showed that 49 percent of respondents in Bulgaria and Hungary – and a staggering 59 percent in Serbia – preferred Trump over Kamala Harris. This is no coincidence. From the AfD supporters in former East Germany to the ruling Georgian Dream party in Tbilisi, illiberal actors across the region are rallying against the liberal democratic consensus. Their views on issues like LGBTQ rights, race, gender, multiculturalism, vaccines and Ukraine mirror those of Trump’s base. Trump’s friendliness towards Vladimir Putin has further enhanced his appeal in Russia-friendly nations like Serbia.
There is also a transnational dimension. Eastern European diasporas in the US tend to favour Trump, drawn by social conservatism or competition with other ethnic and racial groups. Their counterparts in Western Europe are similarly inclined, even as they benefit from the very open-border policies they often deride. In Romania’s recent election, 60 percent of Romanians living in the European Union and the United Kingdom voted for Simion. Many had previously backed Calin Georgescu, a far-right figure publicly defended by US Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference.
At home, elites see in Trump a potential enabler. A powerful friend in Washington who overlooks corruption and democratic backsliding could prove advantageous both domestically and internationally. The prospect of US foreign policy becoming indistinguishable from the Trump Organization’s business agenda is attractive in a region rife with opaque sectors like infrastructure, energy and mining. The recent US-Ukraine critical minerals deal is seen as a blueprint for currying favour with a transactional White House.
This relationship is already yielding dividends. In April, the Trump administration reversed sanctions on Antal Rogan, a close Orban ally, originally imposed under the Global Magnitsky Act by the Biden administration. The move has raised hopes elsewhere: in Bulgaria, tycoon and political heavyweight Delyan Peevski – also sanctioned under Magnitsky – is reportedly eyeing a similar reprieve.
Yet Eastern Europe’s Trump infatuation may prove fragile. Ironically, Trump’s economic nationalism threatens to undercut the very economies governed by his ideological allies. Hungary and Slovakia, both heavily reliant on automotive exports, stand to suffer under US tariffs. Slovakia’s car industry alone accounts for nearly 30 percent of national exports and employs 10 percent of the workforce. Even a modest 10 percent tariff could decimate jobs in Central Europe’s industrial belt.
Such economic fallout would have political consequences. In the Czech Republic, it might boost populist Andrej Babis, a Trump-like businessman. But in Hungary, Orban already faces a serious challenge from Peter Magyar, with elections looming next year. In Slovakia, Robert Fico governs with a slim majority and increasing public dissent – his long-term survival is uncertain.
Trumpism has already proven a liability for right-wing allies in Canada and Australia. While Eastern Europe remains more receptive, the region is not immune to the risks of over-identification with a movement that pits itself against the European Union, liberal values and global economic integration.
The MAGA revolution may still fire up crowds in Bucharest and Belgrade – but its contradictions could just as easily burn those who embrace it.
Despite Donald Trump’s fraying popularity at home, there is a corner of the globe where his brand remains remarkably resilient: Eastern Europe. Last Sunday, the Trump-loving far-right populist George Simion topped the first round of Romania’s presidential elections, securing over 40 percent of the vote and a realistic path to the top office. Echoing Trump’s pledge to “Make America Great Again,” Simion promises to “give back to the Romanian people what was taken from them”. He is not an outlier.In neighbouring Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban openly embraces the mantle of Trump’s European standard-bearer. Trumpworld’s influence in the region extends beyond politics. Jared Kushner is spearheading a real estate venture in downtown Belgrade, and Donald Trump Jr has recently completed his second tour in months of Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria, rubbing shoulders with politicians, business elites and crypto entrepreneurs eager to forge ties with the Trump family.Eastern Europe’s fascination with the “America First” president is fuelled by both ideological alignment and hard-nosed pragmatism. The MAGA message resonates widely across the post-communist landscape. A recent Gallup poll ahead of the 2024 United States election showed that 49 percent of respondents in Bulgaria and Hungary – and a staggering 59 percent in Serbia – preferred Trump over Kamala Harris. This is no coincidence. From the AfD supporters in former East Germany to the ruling Georgian Dream party in Tbilisi, illiberal actors across the region are rallying against the liberal democratic consensus. Their views on issues like LGBTQ rights, race, gender, multiculturalism, vaccines and Ukraine mirror those of Trump’s base. Trump’s friendliness towards Vladimir Putin has further enhanced his appeal in Russia-friendly nations like Serbia.There is also a transnational dimension. Eastern European diasporas in the US tend to favour Trump, drawn by social conservatism or competition with other ethnic and racial groups. Their counterparts in Western Europe are similarly inclined, even as they benefit from the very open-border policies they often deride. In Romania’s recent election, 60 percent of Romanians living in the European Union and the United Kingdom voted for Simion. Many had previously backed Calin Georgescu, a far-right figure publicly defended by US Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference.At home, elites see in Trump a potential enabler. A powerful friend in Washington who overlooks corruption and democratic backsliding could prove advantageous both domestically and internationally. The prospect of US foreign policy becoming indistinguishable from the Trump Organization’s business agenda is attractive in a region rife with opaque sectors like infrastructure, energy and mining. The recent US-Ukraine critical minerals deal is seen as a blueprint for currying favour with a transactional White House.This relationship is already yielding dividends. In April, the Trump administration reversed sanctions on Antal Rogan, a close Orban ally, originally imposed under the Global Magnitsky Act by the Biden administration. The move has raised hopes elsewhere: in Bulgaria, tycoon and political heavyweight Delyan Peevski – also sanctioned under Magnitsky – is reportedly eyeing a similar reprieve.Yet Eastern Europe’s Trump infatuation may prove fragile. Ironically, Trump’s economic nationalism threatens to undercut the very economies governed by his ideological allies. Hungary and Slovakia, both heavily reliant on automotive exports, stand to suffer under US tariffs. Slovakia’s car industry alone accounts for nearly 30 percent of national exports and employs 10 percent of the workforce. Even a modest 10 percent tariff could decimate jobs in Central Europe’s industrial belt.Such economic fallout would have political consequences. In the Czech Republic, it might boost populist Andrej Babis, a Trump-like businessman. But in Hungary, Orban already faces a serious challenge from Peter Magyar, with elections looming next year. In Slovakia, Robert Fico governs with a slim majority and increasing public dissent – his long-term survival is uncertain.Trumpism has already proven a liability for right-wing allies in Canada and Australia. While Eastern Europe remains more receptive, the region is not immune to the risks of over-identification with a movement that pits itself against the European Union, liberal values and global economic integration.The MAGA revolution may still fire up crowds in Bucharest and Belgrade – but its contradictions could just as easily burn those who embrace it.Source - https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2025/5/7/eastern-europe-bets-on-trump-but-at-what-cost
“Salute to the Houthis!” This nationalist cheering appeared across Chinese social media as Western commercial vessels ran a gauntlet of drone and missile attacks in the Red Sea against ships they claimed were traveling to Israel. Meanwhile, ships marked “Chinese Vessel & Crew” sail through these same waters relatively untouched. It’s not a coincidence. Maritime tracking data now confirms what Houthi officials have been openly sharing: Chinese ships receive special treatment in a conflict zone that has become a crucible of hostility toward US interests.This preferential treatment is no accident, but rather the result of careful diplomatic choreography. Recent US Treasury sanctions reveal that Houthi leaders, including Mohamed Ali al-Houthi of the Supreme Political Council, coordinated directly with Chinese officials to guarantee their vessels would not be targeted. This informal pact was formalized during diplomatic talks in Oman, culminating in explicit safe passage guarantees, even as drone and missile strikes against US and other Western shipping escalated. While Houthi officials publicly claim to discriminate between Western and Chinese vessels, their targeting systems remain rudimentary and prone to error, occasionally resulting in mistaken attacks on Chinese ships traversing the narrow Bab el-Mandeb strait, but have shown progress in improving their accuracy, thanks to Chinese technology. For Beijing, its real battle starts on the economic front via the Islamic Republic proxies, where control of vital maritime corridors potentially yields greater advantages than any negotiated trade agreement.This strategic calculation is reflected in China’s official messaging. Xinhua News Agency portrays the crisis as revealing “United States’ impotence” against “non-traditional opponents like the Houthis” while claiming US military intervention has “only triggered more resistance” and exposed “the decline of US economic influence and the gradual disintegration of its alliance system.” Behind this rhetoric lies a clear economic imperative: transit the Red Sea. For Beijing, preserving freedom of movement in this corridor is non-negotiable. While overall shipping traffic through the Red Sea has plunged by nearly 70 percent since attacks began, the proportion of China-linked tonnage has surged, a silent testament to the effectiveness of the arrangement.The impact on European economies has been severe. Major European shipping companies have been forced to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. This creates an artificial competitive advantage for Chinese goods, which continue to flow unimpeded through the Red Sea corridor while European competitors face delays and higher expenses. German and French manufacturers are already reporting supply chain disruptions and lost market share to Chinese competitors, a tangible economic victory for Beijing, which was achieved primarily through proxy conflict rather than direct trade competition with the United States.This arrangement goes beyond short-term tactical cooperation. US sanctions against Chinese satellite and shipping firms provide evidence that Beijing’s technological and logistical support has strengthened Houthi capabilities and created advantages for Chinese maritime interests. Multiple Chinese companies, including Shenzhen Boyu Imports and Exports among others, have been sanctioned for supplying dual-use components that bolster the Houthis’ missile and UAV capabilities. Beijing may not be firing missiles, but it supplies the parts, the software, and the satellite eyes that help aim them.China’s technological and diplomatic support networkIn April 2025, the United States sanctioned Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co. Ltd. (CGSTL) for providing satellite imagery to Yemen’s Houthis that enabled precise strikes on US naval assets in the Red Sea. CGSTL had previously been sanctioned in 2023 for providing battlefield intelligence during its military operations in Ukraine, establishing a pattern of the company acting as a de facto intelligence asset for US adversaries. But CGSTL is no ordinary company, embedded within the Chinese Academy of Sciences and backed by Jilin’s provincial government, it exemplifies China’s military-civil fusion policy, functioning more as an extension of Beijing’s intelligence apparatus than an independent enterprise. Despite Washington’s repeated warnings, Beijing has maintained a posture of strategic denial: providing the tools of war while feigning neutrality and taking no visible corrective action.The technology pipeline from China to the Houthi forces represents a sophisticated approach to proxy warfare. The New York Times documented Chinese-origin hydrogen fuel cells recovered from Houthi drones used in shipping attacks, which extended flight range and reduced detectability. Perhaps most damning was the interception of 800 drone propellers with Chinese identifiers at the Omani border, the same model identified in UAVs used by the Houthis, Iranian-aligned militias in Iraq, and Russian-backed forces in Ukraine. Rather than shipping complete weapons systems, China exports the critical components, guidance modules, propulsion systems, and power supplies, allowing non-state actors to wage asymmetric warfare while Beijing maintains plausible deniability through intermediaries like online vendors operating through Chinese e-commerce platforms.Iran gains leverage, China gains reachChina’s support for Iran strategically allows Beijing to reach its objectives without direct involvement or accountability. In January 2025, two Iranian ships carried over one thousand tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port, an essential ingredient for solid missile fuel. That’s enough to manufacture around 260 medium-range missiles. While China has supplied missile technology to Iran for decades, the scale and visibility of these shipments signal a strategic expansion in the partnership despite China’s denial of involvement. The implications ripple across the region. As Iran’s missile program grows, so does its capacity to arm and sustain proxy groups like the Houthis in Yemen. These groups don’t need long-range missiles; they need enhanced UAVs, better targeting systems, and reliable supply chains, all of which have visibly improved. China doesn’t have to arm the Houthis directly. Strengthening Iran enables a regional network that quietly serves Chinese interests by keeping the United States entangled in costly, low-return conflicts.The quiet alignment between Beijing and Tehran came into sharper focus on April 26, 2025, when a large explosion hit the Bandar Abbas port. While Iranian officials denied importing missile fuel, private security company Ambrey confirmed the port had received these chemicals from China in March. Around the same time as the satellite company sanctions, Washington also targeted companies involved with the Tinos I, a Panama-flagged tanker that secretly carried Iranian oil to China. This operation was backed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, creating a two-way street: Iran gets money for its oil, and China gets both fuel and influence. China’s strategic ambiguity and dual narrativeBeijing has perfected a two-track approach to the Red Sea crisis. Publicly, Chinese officials initially avoided condemning Houthi attacks, instead calling vaguely for “relevant parties” to play “constructive” roles in maintaining stability. Only as international pressure mounted did China’s United Nations representatives acknowledge Houthi disruption of trade, while Chinese vessels continued receiving preferential treatment through Houthi waters.This calculated ambiguity extends to social media, where Chinese users openly celebrate Houthi attacks on Western interests, with one boldly stating: “I want to see news of American and British warships being blown up,” sentiments mirroring earlier support for forces opposing Western interests in Ukraine and Gaza.China’s approach is strategically precise: Beijing doesn’t want Houthi forces to either triumph completely or collapse. It needs them to be active and disruptive, just enough to keep US naval resources tied up while Chinese ships sail through relatively unimpeded. Every Houthi missile that doesn’t target a Chinese vessel becomes a tax on American presence, a stress test for global shipping, and a demonstration of how much disruption Western powers can absorb before retreating or escalating.The Russia-China-Iran nexusThis alignment is now formalized through strategic coordination. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s strategic visits to Moscow and Beijing ahead of each US negotiation round in April 2025 reveal a deliberate synchronization of diplomatic positions. Their March 2025 trilateral talks in Beijing produced a unified stance against Western pressure, with China proposing alternatives directly challenging US positions.Beyond diplomacy, Russia could potentially take custody of Iran’s highly-enriched uranium in future deals, providing technical cover for Iran’s nuclear program. Meanwhile, Chinese firms supply the dual-use technologies empowering Iran’s proxies, including the Houthis. The same drone components documented in Houthi arsenals have appeared in Ukraine, following an identical playbook of low-cost attrition, proxy warfare, and Western hesitation.This alliance continues to deepen, as evidenced by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent twenty-year strategic partnership with Iran in April 2025. While China supplies technology and Iran manages proxies, Russia provides diplomatic cover and international legitimacy, creating a sophisticated system for reshaping regional power dynamics without direct confrontation, while securing preferential maritime passage for Chinese vessels.Business first, influence followsBeijing’s approach to the Houthis represents calculated and deliberate statecraft, not opportunistic coincidence. The Houthi movement now operates with Chinese satellite technology that they could never independently develop, and launches strikes using guidance systems built from Chinese electronics. Washington can sanction individual companies, but unless it confronts the triangulated relationship between China, Iran, and regional proxies, it will always be playing catch-up as Chinese vessels continue to navigate contested waters with relative security.If Washington truly wants to win its economic competition with China, it should focus less on tariffs and more on territorial contestation, pushing China out of strategic regions like the Red Sea, where physical presence, not paper restrictions, determines the future of markets. This requires building stronger strategic relationships with European allies, who are being courted now by China against the United States, who are suffering the economic consequences of this crisis, and who have shared interests in preserving free navigation through vital maritime corridors.Equally important is engaging with the Yemeni people themselves, who are tired of being manipulated by international powers and feel unheard in discussions about their country’s future. Any sustainable solution must address their legitimate grievances rather than treating Yemen merely as a venue for great power competition.Ultimately, Washington must understand that Yemen is no longer a peripheral conflict. It is a live demonstration of how China converts commercial access into strategic leverage, curating conflict, denying responsibility, and watching as US power is bled by a thousand proxy cuts. Meanwhile, while American policymakers debate whether the Houthis are even worth worrying about, Beijing is busy carving safe lanes for its ships and weaponizing instability to tilt global trade in its favor. And as Chinese netizens jubilantly salute the Houthis online, Beijing’s calculated gambit in the Red Sea will continue to yield dividends that no trade negotiation could ever deliver.Source : https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/how-china-turned-the-red-sea-into-a-strategic-trap-for-the-us/
We already understand that the world’s superpowers are adept at managing the shifting global order and international systems. However, as residents of medium-sized countries with limited interest in politics and political systems, we often overlook the significant influence and control that powerful nations have on the world.Nevertheless, since the strategic decisions of these superpowers can profoundly affect medium countries, it is essential for us to constantly monitor the evolving world order and adopt strategies that allow us to adapt to it.In this regard, Myanmar has taken steps to prepare for the emerging trends in the dynamic world order. Myanmar recently hosted the “Forum on Myanmar Beyond 2025: Challenges and Opportunities in a Multipolar World,” inviting international experts in geoeconomics and geopolitics, officials from political parties, and both local and foreign specialists.According to Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin, who contributed a video discussion to the forum, multipolarity is not merely a continuation of the unipolar or bipolar systems. It is a new world order that involves multiple poles of power, surpassing the simplicity of the previous structures. Unlike the previous systems, multipolarity is not defined by rivalry among nation-states but by competition between civilization-states. Therefore, multipolarity arises from rivalries between rich civilization-states. These states, which extend beyond national boundaries, hold significant power. In the modern world, there are roughly four major civilization-states: the global West, China, Russia, and India. Among them, the three are technically countries, their rich cultures, rituals, identities and unique characteristics position them as more than just nation-states.Thus, we are witnessing the emergence of a multipolar world, and the globalist agenda of a unipolar world is becoming a thing of the past. This shift provides an opportunity for all regions to regain and consolidate their sovereignty. Myanmar needs to seize this opportunity and act swiftly to strengthen its autonomy. With rising global dynamics, this is a critical moment for Myanmar to assert its position on the world stage and shape its future free from external pressures. By embracing this transition, Myanmar could create a more balanced and resilient political and economic environment.The Chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC), Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, emphasized Myanmar’s geographical importance during his speech at the forum, noting that “Our country is a long country stretching from north to south. In addition to abundant freshwater rivers, the country has a diverse climate, forests, and a variety of natural resources, including fruit trees. These are our country's opportunities and advantages. Our country has a coastline of over 1,300 miles, and deep-sea ports and economic zones are operating. Our country is located in a geographically central location for maritime trade.”Myanmar must leverage its unique characteristics and cultural identity to balance the interests of neighbouring powers, given its position between two powerful countries. As the SAC Chairman pointed out at the forum, “Our country is surrounded by five neighbouring countries and is located between the most populous nations, China and India. It sits on the communication route between South Asia and Southeast Asia, making it a pivot area. The combined population of Myanmar’s neighbouring countries is nearly four billion, or about 50 percent of the world’s population. This presents a strong market for products produced by Myanmar.”Among neighbouring countries, China recognizes Myanmar's geopolitical significance as a bridge to the Indian Ocean. The Kyaukphyu port, in particular, is of strategic interest to China. Furthermore, China aims to control the Myanmar corridor to benefit its landlocked western provinces and reduce its dependency on the narrow Malacca Strait for sea trade with the West, as well as for fuel imports from the Middle East. Additionally, Myanmar presents a growing market for Chinese commodities and has the potential to be a key source of timber and gems.Myanmar also plays a vital role in India’s “Act East” and “Neighborhood First” policies. The Indian Army has long relied on the policy of “constructive engagement” to conduct joint military operations with Myanmar, primarily aimed at combating extremism in the North-East. This cooperation helps the Tatmadaw contain Myanmar's ethnic insurgencies. Moreover, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport project, a cornerstone of India’s Act East Policy, aims to provide an alternate outlet for the Indian landlocked northeast.Although Russia is not a direct neighbour, its longstanding friendship with Myanmar has led to significant economic and strategic investments, such as the Dawei deep-sea port project, which is set to resume with Russian investment. Furthermore, whenever Myanmar encounters any difficulties, it has always provided assistance, and in the video message sent to this forum by Alexander Dugin, Russia has also pledged its readiness to provide assistance.To recap, Myanmar's strategic location, positioned between these three potential multipolar powers, is an opportunity in the dynamic world order. Myanmar finds itself at a crucial juncture in the evolving global order. However, this potential must be carefully navigated.That said, Myanmar faces significant internal challenges. Since its independence, the country has grappled with persistent internal conflicts that remain unresolved to this day. These conflicts hinder Myanmar’s development and its ability to fully capitalize on the opportunities presented by the changing global order. Without resolving these issues, Myanmar may struggle to chart its own path in the emerging multipolar world. Only through careful navigation of both internal and external dynamics can Myanmar hope to capitalize on the emerging world order and secure a prosperous and resilient future.
There is a very important point to have peace and stability to build a modern and developed disciplined democratic Nation Myanmar is home to various national races and as they have been living together since time immemorial deep-rooted unity and amity have developed among them.Palaeolithic and neolithic culture flourished in many parts of Myanmar from about 20000 years ago learning behind much material evidence as well as the wall painting of “Pyadalin” Cave in Shan Foothills near “Myittha”. A Bronze culture later developed, well represented by the “Nyannggan” archaeological site near “Monywa”, and “Sagaing” Division.The transition to an urban civilization was made in the 2nd century BC. Several cities flourished, among them Wethali (Vaisali) of the Rakhine, Thuwunnabhumi: (Suvannabhumi:), “Land of Gold” of the Mon, and Beikthano (Vishnu City), Hanlin and Thayekkittaya (Sriksetra, “Field of Splendour”) of the “Pyus”, a people whose language has become extinct but whose architectural monuments — the “Bawbawgyi Phayagyi” and “Phayama Pagoda” of Thayekhittaya-remain.Myanmar civilization achieved a high level of development at Bagan from the middle of the 4th century to the end of the 15th century. According to the chronicles, Bagan was founded in AD 107 by the Thamddarit and ruled by a line of 55 kings, but written aridness is available only from “Anawrahta” (1044-1077) onwards “Anawrahta”, the first unifier of Myanmar, established Theravada Buddhism with the help of Buddhist Missionary “Shin Arahan” and laid the foundation of Bagan’s greatness. A thriving economy and the inspiration of Buddhism resulted in the great monument of Shwezigon, Ananda, Thatbyinnyu, Gadawpalin and a host of other pagodas, several of them decorated with mural paintings on religious themes. The decline of Bagan, brought about by a Mingon invasion in 1287, was followed by political confusion and the emergence of two kingdoms Inwa, Founded by “Thadominbya” in 1365, and Hanthawady (Bago) founded by Banya U in 1369 Nineteen kings ruled in Inwa from 1365 to 1552 and 11 kings in Hanthawady from 1369 to 1538, from 1368 to 1422, there was war between Inwa and Hanthawady.Myanmar entered a new phase of greatness when the kings of Taungoo moved their capital from Toungoo moved their capital from “Toungoo” to “Bago” and three of its kings ruled there from 1538 to 1599.“Bayintnaung” (1552-1581), known also as lord of the White Elephants and Conqueror of the Ten Directions, reunited the kingdom, created the vast Hanthawady Empire and rebuilt “Bago” on a magnificent scale.Following the Break-up of the Hanthawady Empire. Nyaungyan (1598-1606) established a new Myanmar Kingdom and ten kings reigned in Inwa from 1598 to 1752. The most famous of the Inwa kings, “Thalun” (1629-1648) built the “Kaunghmudaw” Pagoda near “Sagaing”. A rebellion which started in Bago led to the downfall of the kingdom in 1752.In the tradition of “Anawrahta” and “Bayintnaung”, “Alaungpaya” (1752-1760) reunited Myanmar and established the last Myanmar dynasty of 11 kings who ruled from 1752 to 1885. The kingdom had a number of capitals, including “Shwebo”, “Inwa” and “Amarapura”, with the last capital, Mandalay, being founded by “Mindon” (1852-1878) in 1859.In 1785, the Rakhine kingdom whose capital was “MyaukU”, founded by “Minsawmun” (1430-1433) in 1430, and which had a line of 49 kings reigning from 1430 to 1785, was made part of the Konbaung kingdom.Myanmar fought three wars against the British and lost Rakhine and “Taninthayi” in 1826, lower Myanmar in 1852 and its independence on 1st January 1886. The colonialist British started to rule parts of Myanmar in 1826 and the whole country in 1886.Since our gaining independence, the entire people of Myanmar faced frequently the danger and terrorism, of insurgents and some ethnic armed organizations. In my childhood “Sitkwin” was my native town destroyed by the ethnic armed organization which was named KNDO.Until nowadays, some ethnic armed organizations and PDF terrorists undermine the peace and stability of the regions with terror attacks on town life and the property of innocent people.As a result, acts of violence have increased nationwide leading to the loss of lives home, and possessions and extensive damage to a large number of public infrastructures.As an example, the university building in “Loikaw” was destroyed in attacks by KNPP and PDF terrorists on “Loikaw” last year. So, the university was closed. A total of 114 buildings were damaged at their university. It needs to spend some K9 billion on repairing these buildings. Such a cost can be used in building many projects of agriculture, livestock and regional development tasks.Currently, destructive acts togethering with national stability are becoming more common. Terrorist attacks were often politically motivated and different forms of crime were prevalent in various regions. These acts include violence that harms civilians, damages public infrastructure and threatens private buildings, residential areas, and villages with heavy weapons and bombs. They have also targeted non-military entities, such as cargo trucks, passenger vehicles and residential buildings all of which harm innocent civilians.Terrorists have been repeatedly targeting villages that do not support them, using tactics such as dropping bombs launching surprise attacks and planting landmines. These acts have led to frequent casualties among innocent civilians and Buddhist monks. The brutal actions of terrorist groups have caused widespread fear among residents, prompting security forces to intensify protective measures in the affected areas.A society free from coercion, threats, and criminal activities allows people to enjoy the benefits of peace which in turn fosters national progress.The government is working toward ensuring long-term stability by adhering to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and striving to end armed conflict across the country. Efforts are focused on maintaining peace and the rule of law with local militia groups playing a rob in protecting regions where the rule of law is not fully enforced.Some ethnic armed organizations, with misguided attitudes towards the state and its people, also took advantage of the ensuing stability to launch terror attacks and destroy peaceful regions. As a result of these events, innocent civilians lost their lives, homes and belongings as well as public infrastructure in the area.In our country over 100 ethnic groups have lived in friendship and harmony since time immemorial. All the national people have found unity in diversity having been born and living on the same land. The geographical features of our country include high mountain ranges and major rivers. That flow from the north to the south made transport difficult and impeded interactions among the national people. Moreover, under colonialism, they were subject to many years of systematic divide-and-rule practice. The national people became suspicious of one another promoting our leader to make strenuous efforts during the struggle for our independence so that the central Myanmar and the mountainous regions could gain independence together.The noble Buddha said that “Samagganan Tutpaw Thukhaw” (သမဂ္ဂါနံ တပေါ သုခေါ — ပေါင်းစည်းညီညွတ်စည်းလုံးခြင်းသည် ကြီးပွားချမ်းသာတိုးတက်ခြင်း၏ အကြောင်းရင်း ဖြစ်၏။) likewise, “Unity is Strength” is a Myanmar Proverb.A society without unity is probably occupied and destroyed by external and internal enemies. It is very important for every important nation regardless of the place they live to have a strong Union Spirit. Only the Union Spirit is the true patriotism all the nationalities will have to safeguard. Our Three Main National Causes: Namely, the Non-disintegration of the Union, the Non-disintegration of National Solidarity and the Perpetuation of Sovereignty are bound duties of the people. Today neocolonialists usually interfere with their multi-dimensional warfare with sovereign states.Our national people have the right to settle anywhere in the country with the result that in every area magnanimous national people have harmoniously to live. In this day and age, it is impossible to separate each national people and the very thoughts and notions that give rise to such regional bias have become anachronistic. This is a sign of progress for greater national reconsolidation. I would like to reconsolidation. I would like to urge you to build on the national reconsolidation that might lead to the disintegration of the Union.Today the State Administration Council (SAC) is implementing two political visions – to strengthen the genuine disciplined multiparty democratic system and to build a Union based on disciplined democracy and Federalism. The stability and peace of our nation along with the rule of law are crucial for the country’s development and nation-building. Therefore, I deeply and respectfully urge the entire people including all ethnic people including all ethnic peoples to work together with the government to achieve a ceasefire in armed conflicts. I indeed believe that we surely get the fruits of peace and stability when internal armed conflicts end based on the Spirit of Union and Patriotism.Source: The Global New Light of Myanmar
A dramatic day of high stakes diplomacy at the United Nations has exposed growing cracks in the transatlantic alliance since President Donald Trump returned to the global stage and massively shifted US foreign policy.When Russia invaded Ukraine three years ago, Europe had no stronger partner than the United States.But this week, in the halls of the General Assembly and at the Security Council, the US worked against its closest allies and sided with Russia, Belarus and North Korea to pass resolutions on the conflict in Ukraine.To mark the third anniversary of Moscow's invasion, Ukraine sought a symbolic General Assembly resolution that would require the 193-member body to reaffirm Kyiv's territorial integrity and call for Russia to withdraw its forces in line with the UN charter.That resolution did pass on Monday, but with less support than in past years. Many members abstained to avoid a tricky tension created by the US.Washington's diplomats had urged other countries to vote against the measure and to instead support their "forward looking resolution" that was only three short paragraphs. It took a neutral stance on the war, without blaming Russia, and called for a swift end with a lasting peace to follow.Washington not only introduced their measure in the General Assembly where every nation's vote is equal, but also in the more powerful Security Council. Resolutions there are legally binding - though sometimes hard to enforce - and there had never been council action on Ukraine because of Russia's veto power as a permanent member.The move caught Europe off guard. One European diplomat told the BBC that the US behaved like a bully and did not take into account their stance on their continent's security.Another who sits on the Security Council, Slovenia's ambassador Samuel Zbogar, told the BBC that Europe is struggling to adjust to the 180-degree change in the US position - and the speed at which Washington is moving.He said the European Union will need to do some reflecting at the body's council meeting next week."Leaders will have to develop a plan on how the EU can actively be involved in finding peace, rather than reacting to what others are doing. It's up to us now in Europe to come forward," he told the BBC.There were plenty of reactions in the halls of UN headquarters in New York, as European leaders worked to reconcile with the latest US position.Source: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y0de4wpvlo?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR18_UUqp4xuLyl78FVSjSePRFD52PLyD1L9c9P37IJ_RfO0uhTEWpREBQ_aem_vkzsBu5AVLNanQDf2RzMmQ
Southeast Asian countries need to hedge and expand trade and security alliances to navigate changing increased protectionism and changing geopolitics under the second term of US President Donald Trump, an online forum heard on Feb 12. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may not be a key priority in Trump's foreign policy, but what is significant is how individual ASEAN countries deal with the United States and other major powers, according to the experts who participated in the webinar "Asia and Trump 2.0: Geopolitical Outlooks". The webinar is organized by the Asian Center (AC), University of the Philippines.Experts have noted how Trump's policy of raising tariffs imposed against its major trading partners like China is also affecting ASEAN as the region is also part of the China supply chain. They also cited Trump's directives such as the US withdrawal from the Paris climate pact and the World Health Organization will have repercussions worldwide. But while ASEAN countries are not major powers, these countries "still have agency" when it comes to international relations, according to Melissa Hubahib Loja, a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for European, Comparative, and Constitutional Legal Studies, University of Copenhagen. "The best way for (non-major powers) to exercise their agency is to adopt a rational approach to real politics," Loja said, noting that balancing, band wagoning and hedging are the "rational strategic options" for small states. Collin Koh Swee Lean, senior fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, cited Singapore as a case study in 6 strategic hedging. Koh said the city-state, a small and trade-dependent economy, maintains a consistent and principled foreign policy when dealing with major powers like the US and China. Koh said that regional governments like ASEAN are not likely to choose sides and would instead choose to band together to assert their interest on the global stage. "We are likely going to see greater intra-ASEAN cooperation," he said, adding that he expects ASEAN member states to agree on more vital issues, especially on trade as US tariff hikes threaten their respective economies. Koh also sees "growing participation in regional security" by other non-US regional powers such as those in either the Pacific or Europe. Maria Thaemar Tana, Japan Foundation Global Japan Studies Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, University of Tokyo, said that while hedging remains ASEAN's "best strategy", its effectiveness is limited by internal divisions, weak enforcement mechanisms and growing external pressures. Aaron Jed Rabena, assistant professor at the Asian Center, said ASEAN countries and reduce dependence on the US in light of Trump's "unpredictable and volatile" trade and foreign policy. However, Rabena added that the strategy of each ASEAN nation also varies from time to time based on their perceived and actual threats and opportunities.He said that while most ASEAN countries don't have a dispute with China, this is not the case with the Philippines. The Philippines currently has a defense treaty with the US and has a dispute with China over the South Sea. "This is quite a challenging strategic environment, but the Philippines really needs to find the right balance in its foreign policy," Rabena said.For Noel Christian Moratilla, dean of the Asian Center, "neutrality is what is imperative and applicable at this point". He said that this has already happened in the past, with the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 at the height of the Cold War. Moratilla said there's no point for the Philippines to antagonize either the US or China and learn from other ASEAN countries "as to how they do it, and also as not to appear very adversarial and very hostile to either one of them". Irine Hiraswari Gayatri, senior researcher at the Research Center for Politics, National Research and Innovation Agency in Indonesia, said Indonesia is diversifying economic partnerships to reduce reliance on the US market. For example, Gayatri said Indonesia has joined BRICS, demonstrating how is widening alliances. She said Indonesia "maintains strategic autonomy while regulating partnerships with both China and the US."
