Diplomatic relations between Myanmar and China have reached their diamond jubilee anniversary on 8 June 2025. The state-level grand celebration of the 75th anniversary of the Myanmar-China diplomatic tie was held in Nay Pyi Taw yesterday.
Bound by history, Myanmar and China have been sharing the intertwined fates with fraternal ties since prehistoric times.
The most ancient tie between the two countries was evidenced as early as 4 BC; there was a trade route linking China’s Sichuan and Yunnan provinces with Myanmar. Again, in the Chinese Tang Dynasty from 618-907 AD, a team of musicians and dancers from Myanmar’s Pyu Dynasty visited the capital of the Chinese Tang Dynasty and exchanged cultures. The very first Myanmar diplomat to China can be traced back to Myanmar’s Bagan Dynasty in the 12th century when the Venerable Sayadaw Shin Ditha Pamauk arrived in Beijing for negotiations, which concluded as a success story of an ancient diplomatic milestone between the two countries with mutual respect and understanding.
Sharing the geographical origins of mountains, hills and rivers, the two countries experienced similar historical paths, particularly in World War II when the world stood against fascism eighty years ago. While Russia (former Soviet Union) fought Nazi Germany together with its allies in the European frontline, Myanmar and China fought the Japanese fascists in the Asian frontline respectively. Historical records estimate that around 20 million Chinese sacrificed their lives and souls in the battles resisting the Japanese aggression, while Myanmar lost at least one million citizens in the struggle to expel Japanese fascist forces.
Myanmar and China established a strategic partnership as early as in fighting back the Japanese invasions, notably through the construction of the Yunnan-Myanmar Road, connecting Kunming in China’s Yunnan Province and Lashio in Myanmar’s Shan State. This vital route played a crucial role in the supply chain for China in resisting Japanese aggression. Chinese forces provided reciprocal support to the Myanmar Army in combatting Japanese invaders, especially in the frontline in northern Myanmar and the southern part of China. More than just neighbouring countries, Myanmar and China stood as allies in defending their sovereignty against foreign invasion. This reflects their Swe Myo Pauk Phaw spirit in the shared struggle against colonialism during the 1940s.
Accordingly, since World War II, Myanmar and China have already developed the groundwork for a “Community of Common Destiny for Mankind” or a “Shared Future” through their efforts.
The sense of a shared future and shared interests reflects togetherness on the road to building peace, development and prosperity, which will be shared among each other by recognizing differences and diversities with mutual respect and trust.
Today, the world is reshaping the international order toward a global environment with peace, justice and equality which guarantees for non-hegemonic arena; the People’s Republic of China is one of the steering nations in this mechanism guided by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, of which, both Myanmar and China were pioneering signatories dating back in 1954.
What is more, Myanmar was the first non-communist country that recognized the new China after its founding of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949. Furthermore, Myanmar is the very first neighbouring country to China that peacefully agreed to finalize the bilateral border demarcation; and the two countries have never ever had any disputes over their shared boundary ownership.
Under the Swe Myo Pauk-Phaw (fraternal) tie, Myanmar and China uphold mutual support in the international diplomatic realm. As an all-weather friend of China, Myanmar consistently supports the ‘One China’ policy and firmly rejects any acts of aggression against China carried out from Myanmar territory. Reciprocally, China has persistently maintained its steadfast diplomatic support to Myanmar on the international stage in every successive era.
However, without a doubt, the threats posed by neocolonialism have repeatedly sought to weaken this deep-rooted solidarity between the two Asian nations, which have been sharing affection for thousands of years with mutual respect. Both countries, Myanmar and China, firmly reject hegemonism, any attempts to distabilize the region, and neocolonial interference in any disguise, standing together in unity and supporting each other through every challenge.
The concept of a shared future and shared interests for a common destiny are the core values that should be vested in the global trend of multipolarity. The two leaders, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing of Myanmar and President Xi Jinping of the PRC jointly upheld the United Nationscentered international system and the international order underpinned by international law and safeguarded the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries when they met in Moscow in early May at the sideline of the Grand Celebration of 80th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. Their meeting reached an important consensus on building the Myanmar-China community with a shared future.
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and President Xi Jinping exchanged congratulatory messages on the occasion of the diamond jubilee anniversary of the bilateral tie on Sunday.
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing emphasized that the longstanding “Pauk-Phaw” friendship, which was cultivated by successive generations of leadership, has continued to grow stronger over time. In 2011, this enduring relationship was elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership. President Xi Jinping’s historic visit to Myanmar in 2020 marked a new chapter in bilateral relations, during which both nations reaffirmed their commitment to building a Myanmar-China community with a shared future.
In return, Chinese President Xi Jinping also highlighted in his congratulations that the friendship between Myanmar and China has stood the test of time and grown even stronger, adding that upholding the jointly advocated Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Bandung Spirit, the two countries have been committed to good neighbourliness, deepened mutually beneficial cooperation, and firmly supported each other on issues regarding their respective core interests and major concerns, setting a fine example of friendly exchange between countries.
China, as a rising power with strong economic and political unity, having a highly esteemed cultural status, consistently shares weals and woes in multi-faceted issues. China’s vast and immediate assistance in the recent major earthquake in Myanmar deserves earnest recognition as a milestone in the humanitarian efforts in Myanmar. The people of Myanmar always express our heart-touched gratitude to the government and the people of China for their timely and generous humanitarian assistance in earthquake management. What is more, it is our sincere appreciation to China for its unwavering support in Myanmar’s efforts to achieve long-lasting peace and stability, national reconciliation, and socioeconomic development.
The enduring ties between Myanmar and China bearing the Pauk Phaw spirit will stand lasting over to our future generations and descendants for the next thousands of years with resilient love.

Source: The Global New Light of Myanmar

In modern conflict zones, proposals for "humanitarian corridors" are often introduced as emergency mechanisms for delivering aid to civilians caught in crossfires. On paper, the concept appears benevolent and necessary: create temporary access routes through embattled or inaccessible regions, allowing food, medicine, and emergency supplies to reach vulnerable populations. However, beneath the humanitarian impulse lies a complex web of legal, political, and security vulnerabilities, especially when such corridors traverse territories controlled by non-state armed actors.

Undermining Sovereignty: The Legal Dilemma

The foundation of international relations is built on the principle of state sovereignty. Enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and reaffirmed by instruments such as the Declaration on Principles of International Law (1970) and customary international law, this principle affirms that each state has the exclusive right to control its internal affairs and territorial integrity without external interference.

Humanitarian corridors that bypass the central government and engage with non-state actors challenge this principle. When aid operations are coordinated with entities that do not hold recognized sovereignty, such actions can amount to de facto legitimization of parallel governance structures. This poses a dangerous precedent: legitimizing governance by force, rather than by law or democratic process.

According to International Humanitarian Law (IHL), particularly under the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, humanitarian access must be consented to by the state party concerned. Article 70(1) of Additional Protocol I states that relief actions "shall be undertaken subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned." In non-international armed conflicts, which fall under Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, humanitarian operations still require state consent, unless the Security Council authorizes otherwise under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Thus, from a legal perspective, humanitarian corridors established without the consent of the host state or a clear UN mandate may be illegitimate. They risk violating the principle of non-intervention and may be interpreted as an infringement on state sovereignty, potentially amounting to an internationally wrongful act.

The Philadelphi Corridor: A Warning from the Middle East

The so-called Philadelphi Corridor provides a real-world cautionary tale. Situated along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, this narrow strip was initially created under the Oslo Accords to serve as a buffer zone for monitoring arms smuggling and providing a humanitarian lifeline to Gaza.

Despite this objective, the corridor was quickly co-opted by Hamas, a designated terrorist organization in many countries, which used it as a conduit for smuggling weapons, ammunition, and military supplies into Gaza. Tunnels were dug beneath the corridor, enabling the steady flow of contraband. What was meant to be a route for humanitarian relief morphed into a strategic asset for militant actors, fueling violence in the region.

Eventually, citing national security concerns, Israel seized control of the corridor and announced it would never relinquish it again. This episode illustrates how humanitarian mechanisms, when not robustly governed, can directly compromise the security of neighboring states and prolong violent conflict.

The case also underscores a core principle of International Humanitarian Law: humanitarian aid must be neutral, impartial, and independent. When these principles are not observed, corridors can be repurposed for strategic advantage. The abuse of humanitarian access undermines not only security, but also the legitimacy of humanitarian norms.

Security Vulnerabilities in Fragile Regions

In regions where central authority is weak or contested, the establishment of humanitarian corridors poses a range of security risks:

• Weapons and Narcotics Smuggling: Corridors passing through areas outside government control can become unmonitored pathways for illicit activities.

• Terrorist Infiltration: Unregulated access can enable the movement of extremist fighters across borders or conflict lines.

• Empowerment of Illicit Actors: By providing access to resources and international legitimacy, corridors can embolden non-state actors and entrench their control over territory.

Security guarantees in such regions are difficult to enforce. Unlike the Philadelphi Corridor, where Egypt and Qatar attempted (unsuccessfully) to provide monitoring forces, many conflict zones lack reliable third-party security providers. Who takes responsibility if the corridor is hijacked? Who ensures neutrality, safety, and the exclusive delivery of aid?

Furthermore, the financial burden of establishing and maintaining such corridors is immense. International organizations, including the United Nations, are often already overstretched. Meanwhile, donor fatigue and shifting geopolitical priorities limit the capacity of major powers to fund and secure such operations. Without robust oversight and sustained support, the risk of abuse becomes all but certain.

Moral Hazard and Political Liability

A less discussed but equally important issue is moral hazard. If international actors sidestep state authority to deliver aid, they may unintentionally incentivize armed groups to seize territory, knowing that humanitarian support will follow. This creates a perverse cycle: the more territory they control, the more likely they are to gain de facto recognition and access to resources.

Should weapons or contraband be smuggled through these corridors, neighboring states and international agencies that facilitated them could be held partially responsible. In a world increasingly governed by legal norms, liability does not stop at borders.

According to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), states may bear responsibility for aid programs that cause harm if they knowingly contribute to violations of international obligations. If aid leads to unintended consequences like arming militants or destabilizing neighboring regions, those involved may face not just political fallout but also legal scrutiny.

The Path Forward: Upholding Law and Sovereignty

The urgency of humanitarian need should not blind policymakers to the long-term strategic consequences of their decisions. Aid must be delivered in a manner that respects national sovereignty, supports the rule of law, and does not enable or legitimize actors who operate outside international norms.

In short, humanitarianism must not be weaponized. The international community has a responsibility to ensure that aid does not become a tool of conflict, but rather a bridge to peace. The experience of the Philadelphi Corridor is not just a warning—it is a blueprint of how good intentions can be hijacked without firm adherence to international law.

References;

1. United Nations Charter, Article 2(4)
   https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text
2. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (UNGA Resolution 2625, 1970)
   https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_2625/ga_2625_ph_e.pdf
3. Geneva Conventions (1949) and Additional Protocols (1977)
   https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties
4. Article 70, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
   (On relief actions and required state consent)
   https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-70
5. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
   https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gc-1949-1/article-3
6. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001)
   https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf
7. UN Security Council Resolution 2165 (2014) – Authorizing cross-border humanitarian aid in Syria/ https://undocs.org/S/RES/2165(2014)
8. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – Guidelines on humanitarian access/ https://www.unocha.org/
9. Sassòli, Marco. International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019.
10. Fleck, Dieter (Ed.). The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law. Oxford University Press, 2013.
11. Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict (PILAC)
    https://pilac.law.harvard.edu/
12. ICRC Commentaries on International Humanitarian Law
    https://www.icrc.org/en/document/humanitarian-access-and-law
13. Byman, Daniel. A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. Oxford University Press, 2011.
14. Rubin, Barry. The Truth About Syria. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
15. BBC News – Gaza smuggling tunnels: The life beneath (on Philadelphi tunnels)
    https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11098259
16. Council on Foreign Relations – Hamas and Gaza’s Tunnels
    https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hamas-and-gazas-tunnels

Despite Donald Trump’s fraying popularity at home, there is a corner of the globe where his brand remains remarkably resilient: Eastern Europe. Last Sunday, the Trump-loving far-right populist George Simion topped the first round of Romania’s presidential elections, securing over 40 percent of the vote and a realistic path to the top office. Echoing Trump’s pledge to “Make America Great Again,” Simion promises to “give back to the Romanian people what was taken from them”. He is not an outlier.

In neighbouring Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban openly embraces the mantle of Trump’s European standard-bearer. Trumpworld’s influence in the region extends beyond politics. Jared Kushner is spearheading a real estate venture in downtown Belgrade, and Donald Trump Jr has recently completed his second tour in months of Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria, rubbing shoulders with politicians, business elites and crypto entrepreneurs eager to forge ties with the Trump family.

Eastern Europe’s fascination with the “America First” president is fuelled by both ideological alignment and hard-nosed pragmatism. The MAGA message resonates widely across the post-communist landscape. A recent Gallup poll ahead of the 2024 United States election showed that 49 percent of respondents in Bulgaria and Hungary – and a staggering 59 percent in Serbia – preferred Trump over Kamala Harris. This is no coincidence. From the AfD supporters in former East Germany to the ruling Georgian Dream party in Tbilisi, illiberal actors across the region are rallying against the liberal democratic consensus. Their views on issues like LGBTQ rights, race, gender, multiculturalism, vaccines and Ukraine mirror those of Trump’s base. Trump’s friendliness towards Vladimir Putin has further enhanced his appeal in Russia-friendly nations like Serbia.

There is also a transnational dimension. Eastern European diasporas in the US tend to favour Trump, drawn by social conservatism or competition with other ethnic and racial groups. Their counterparts in Western Europe are similarly inclined, even as they benefit from the very open-border policies they often deride. In Romania’s recent election, 60 percent of Romanians living in the European Union and the United Kingdom voted for Simion. Many had previously backed Calin Georgescu, a far-right figure publicly defended by US Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference.

At home, elites see in Trump a potential enabler. A powerful friend in Washington who overlooks corruption and democratic backsliding could prove advantageous both domestically and internationally. The prospect of US foreign policy becoming indistinguishable from the Trump Organization’s business agenda is attractive in a region rife with opaque sectors like infrastructure, energy and mining. The recent US-Ukraine critical minerals deal is seen as a blueprint for currying favour with a transactional White House.

This relationship is already yielding dividends. In April, the Trump administration reversed sanctions on Antal Rogan, a close Orban ally, originally imposed under the Global Magnitsky Act by the Biden administration. The move has raised hopes elsewhere: in Bulgaria, tycoon and political heavyweight Delyan Peevski – also sanctioned under Magnitsky – is reportedly eyeing a similar reprieve.

Yet Eastern Europe’s Trump infatuation may prove fragile. Ironically, Trump’s economic nationalism threatens to undercut the very economies governed by his ideological allies. Hungary and Slovakia, both heavily reliant on automotive exports, stand to suffer under US tariffs. Slovakia’s car industry alone accounts for nearly 30 percent of national exports and employs 10 percent of the workforce. Even a modest 10 percent tariff could decimate jobs in Central Europe’s industrial belt.

Such economic fallout would have political consequences. In the Czech Republic, it might boost populist Andrej Babis, a Trump-like businessman. But in Hungary, Orban already faces a serious challenge from Peter Magyar, with elections looming next year. In Slovakia, Robert Fico governs with a slim majority and increasing public dissent – his long-term survival is uncertain.

Trumpism has already proven a liability for right-wing allies in Canada and Australia. While Eastern Europe remains more receptive, the region is not immune to the risks of over-identification with a movement that pits itself against the European Union, liberal values and global economic integration.

The MAGA revolution may still fire up crowds in Bucharest and Belgrade – but its contradictions could just as easily burn those who embrace it.

Source - https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2025/5/7/eastern-europe-bets-on-trump-but-at-what-cost

“Salute to the Houthis!” This nationalist cheering appeared across Chinese social media as Western commercial vessels ran a gauntlet of drone and missile attacks in the Red Sea against ships they claimed were traveling to Israel. Meanwhile, ships marked “Chinese Vessel & Crew” sail through these same waters relatively untouched. It’s not a coincidence. Maritime tracking data now confirms what Houthi officials have been openly sharing: Chinese ships receive special treatment in a conflict zone that has become a crucible of hostility toward US interests.

This preferential treatment is no accident, but rather the result of careful diplomatic choreography. Recent US Treasury sanctions reveal that Houthi leaders, including Mohamed Ali al-Houthi of the Supreme Political Council, coordinated directly with Chinese officials to guarantee their vessels would not be targeted. This informal pact was formalized during diplomatic talks in Oman, culminating in explicit safe passage guarantees, even as drone and missile strikes against US and other Western shipping escalated. While Houthi officials publicly claim to discriminate between Western and Chinese vessels, their targeting systems remain rudimentary and prone to error, occasionally resulting in mistaken attacks on Chinese ships traversing the narrow Bab el-Mandeb strait, but have shown progress in improving their accuracy, thanks to Chinese technology. 

For Beijing, its real battle starts on the economic front via the Islamic Republic proxies, where control of vital maritime corridors potentially yields greater advantages than any negotiated trade agreement.

This strategic calculation is reflected in China’s official messaging. Xinhua News Agency portrays the crisis as revealing “United States’ impotence” against “non-traditional opponents like the Houthis” while claiming US military intervention has “only triggered more resistance” and exposed “the decline of US economic influence and the gradual disintegration of its alliance system.” Behind this rhetoric lies a clear economic imperative: transit the Red Sea. For Beijing, preserving freedom of movement in this corridor is non-negotiable. While overall shipping traffic through the Red Sea has plunged by nearly 70 percent since attacks began, the proportion of China-linked tonnage has surged, a silent testament to the effectiveness of the arrangement.

The impact on European economies has been severe. Major European shipping companies have been forced to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. This creates an artificial competitive advantage for Chinese goods, which continue to flow unimpeded through the Red Sea corridor while European competitors face delays and higher expenses. German and French manufacturers are already reporting supply chain disruptions and lost market share to Chinese competitors, a tangible economic victory for Beijing, which was achieved primarily through proxy conflict rather than direct trade competition with the United States.

This arrangement goes beyond short-term tactical cooperation. US sanctions against Chinese satellite and shipping firms provide evidence that Beijing’s technological and logistical support has strengthened Houthi capabilities and created advantages for Chinese maritime interests. Multiple Chinese companies, including Shenzhen Boyu Imports and Exports among others, have been sanctioned for supplying dual-use components that bolster the Houthis’ missile and UAV capabilities. Beijing may not be firing missiles, but it supplies the parts, the software, and the satellite eyes that help aim them.

China’s technological and diplomatic support network

In April 2025, the United States sanctioned Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co. Ltd. (CGSTL) for providing satellite imagery to Yemen’s Houthis that enabled precise strikes on US naval assets in the Red Sea. CGSTL had previously been sanctioned in 2023 for providing battlefield intelligence during its military operations in Ukraine, establishing a pattern of the company acting as a de facto intelligence asset for US adversaries. But CGSTL is no ordinary company, embedded within the Chinese Academy of Sciences and backed by Jilin’s provincial government, it exemplifies China’s military-civil fusion policy, functioning more as an extension of Beijing’s intelligence apparatus than an independent enterprise. Despite Washington’s repeated warnings, Beijing has maintained a posture of strategic denial: providing the tools of war while feigning neutrality and taking no visible corrective action.

The technology pipeline from China to the Houthi forces represents a sophisticated approach to proxy warfare. The New York Times documented Chinese-origin hydrogen fuel cells recovered from Houthi drones used in shipping attacks, which extended flight range and reduced detectability. Perhaps most damning was the interception of 800 drone propellers with Chinese identifiers at the Omani border, the same model identified in UAVs used by the Houthis, Iranian-aligned militias in Iraq, and Russian-backed forces in Ukraine. Rather than shipping complete weapons systems, China exports the critical components, guidance modules, propulsion systems, and power supplies, allowing non-state actors to wage asymmetric warfare while Beijing maintains plausible deniability through intermediaries like online vendors operating through Chinese e-commerce platforms.

Iran gains leverage, China gains reach

China’s support for Iran strategically allows Beijing to reach its objectives without direct involvement or accountability. In January 2025, two Iranian ships carried over one thousand tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port, an essential ingredient for solid missile fuel. That’s enough to manufacture around 260 medium-range missiles. While China has supplied missile technology to Iran for decades, the scale and visibility of these shipments signal a strategic expansion in the partnership despite China’s denial of involvement.    

The implications ripple across the region. As Iran’s missile program grows, so does its capacity to arm and sustain proxy groups like the Houthis in Yemen. These groups don’t need long-range missiles; they need enhanced UAVs, better targeting systems, and reliable supply chains, all of which have visibly improved. China doesn’t have to arm the Houthis directly. Strengthening Iran enables a regional network that quietly serves Chinese interests by keeping the United States entangled in costly, low-return conflicts.

The quiet alignment between Beijing and Tehran came into sharper focus on April 26, 2025, when a large explosion hit the Bandar Abbas port. While Iranian officials denied importing missile fuel, private security company Ambrey confirmed the port had received these chemicals from China in March. Around the same time as the satellite company sanctions, Washington also targeted companies involved with the Tinos I, a Panama-flagged tanker that secretly carried Iranian oil to China. This operation was backed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, creating a two-way street: Iran gets money for its oil, and China gets both fuel and influence. 

China’s strategic ambiguity and dual narrative

Beijing has perfected a two-track approach to the Red Sea crisis. Publicly, Chinese officials initially avoided condemning Houthi attacks, instead calling vaguely for “relevant parties” to play “constructive” roles in maintaining stability. Only as international pressure mounted did China’s United Nations representatives acknowledge Houthi disruption of trade, while Chinese vessels continued receiving preferential treatment through Houthi waters.

This calculated ambiguity extends to social media, where Chinese users openly celebrate Houthi attacks on Western interests, with one boldly stating: “I want to see news of American and British warships being blown up,” sentiments mirroring earlier support for forces opposing Western interests in Ukraine and Gaza.

China’s approach is strategically precise: Beijing doesn’t want Houthi forces to either triumph completely or collapse. It needs them to be active and disruptive, just enough to keep US naval resources tied up while Chinese ships sail through relatively unimpeded. Every Houthi missile that doesn’t target a Chinese vessel becomes a tax on American presence, a stress test for global shipping, and a demonstration of how much disruption Western powers can absorb before retreating or escalating.

The Russia-China-Iran nexus

This alignment is now formalized through strategic coordination. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s strategic visits to Moscow and Beijing ahead of each US negotiation round in April 2025 reveal a deliberate synchronization of diplomatic positions. Their March 2025 trilateral talks in Beijing produced a unified stance against Western pressure, with China proposing alternatives directly challenging US positions.

Beyond diplomacy, Russia could potentially take custody of Iran’s highly-enriched uranium in future deals, providing technical cover for Iran’s nuclear program. Meanwhile, Chinese firms supply the dual-use technologies empowering Iran’s proxies, including the Houthis. The same drone components documented in Houthi arsenals have appeared in Ukraine, following an identical playbook of low-cost attrition, proxy warfare, and Western hesitation.

This alliance continues to deepen, as evidenced by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent twenty-year strategic partnership with Iran in April 2025.  While China supplies technology and Iran manages proxies, Russia provides diplomatic cover and international legitimacy, creating a sophisticated system for reshaping regional power dynamics without direct confrontation, while securing preferential maritime passage for Chinese vessels.

Business first, influence follows

Beijing’s approach to the Houthis represents calculated and deliberate statecraft, not opportunistic coincidence. The Houthi movement now operates with Chinese satellite technology that they could never independently develop, and launches strikes using guidance systems built from Chinese electronics. Washington can sanction individual companies, but unless it confronts the triangulated relationship between China, Iran, and regional proxies, it will always be playing catch-up as Chinese vessels continue to navigate contested waters with relative security.

If Washington truly wants to win its economic competition with China, it should focus less on tariffs and more on territorial contestation, pushing China out of strategic regions like the Red Sea, where physical presence, not paper restrictions, determines the future of markets. This requires building stronger strategic relationships with European allies, who are being courted now by China against the United States, who are suffering the economic consequences of this crisis, and who have shared interests in preserving free navigation through vital maritime corridors.

Equally important is engaging with the Yemeni people themselves, who are tired of being manipulated by international powers and feel unheard in discussions about their country’s future. Any sustainable solution must address their legitimate grievances rather than treating Yemen merely as a venue for great power competition.

Ultimately, Washington must understand that Yemen is no longer a peripheral conflict. It is a live demonstration of how China converts commercial access into strategic leverage, curating conflict, denying responsibility, and watching as US power is bled by a thousand proxy cuts. Meanwhile, while American policymakers debate whether the Houthis are even worth worrying about, Beijing is busy carving safe lanes for its ships and weaponizing instability to tilt global trade in its favor. And as Chinese netizens jubilantly salute the Houthis online, Beijing’s calculated gambit in the Red Sea will continue to yield dividends that no trade negotiation could ever deliver.

Source : https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/how-china-turned-the-red-sea-into-a-strategic-trap-for-the-us/

A dramatic day of high stakes diplomacy at the United Nations has exposed growing cracks in the transatlantic alliance since President Donald Trump returned to the global stage and massively shifted US foreign policy.

When Russia invaded Ukraine three years ago, Europe had no stronger partner than the United States.

But this week, in the halls of the General Assembly and at the Security Council, the US worked against its closest allies and sided with Russia, Belarus and North Korea to pass resolutions on the conflict in Ukraine.

To mark the third anniversary of Moscow's invasion, Ukraine sought a symbolic General Assembly resolution that would require the 193-member body to reaffirm Kyiv's territorial integrity and call for Russia to withdraw its forces in line with the UN charter.

That resolution did pass on Monday, but with less support than in past years. Many members abstained to avoid a tricky tension created by the US.

Washington's diplomats had urged other countries to vote against the measure and to instead support their "forward looking resolution" that was only three short paragraphs. It took a neutral stance on the war, without blaming Russia, and called for a swift end with a lasting peace to follow.

Washington not only introduced their measure in the General Assembly where every nation's vote is equal, but also in the more powerful Security Council. Resolutions there are legally binding - though sometimes hard to enforce - and there had never been council action on Ukraine because of Russia's veto power as a permanent member.

The move caught Europe off guard. One European diplomat told the BBC that the US behaved like a bully and did not take into account their stance on their continent's security.

Another who sits on the Security Council, Slovenia's ambassador Samuel Zbogar, told the BBC that Europe is struggling to adjust to the 180-degree change in the US position - and the speed at which Washington is moving.

He said the European Union will need to do some reflecting at the body's council meeting next week.

"Leaders will have to develop a plan on how the EU can actively be involved in finding peace, rather than reacting to what others are doing. It's up to us now in Europe to come forward," he told the BBC.

There were plenty of reactions in the halls of UN headquarters in New York, as European leaders worked to reconcile with the latest US position.

Source: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y0de4wpvlo?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR18_UUqp4xuLyl78FVSjSePRFD52PLyD1L9c9P37IJ_RfO0uhTEWpREBQ_aem_vkzsBu5AVLNanQDf2RzMmQ

 Southeast Asian countries need to hedge and expand trade and security alliances to navigate changing increased protectionism and changing geopolitics under the second term of US President Donald Trump, an online forum heard on Feb 12. 

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may not be a key priority in Trump's foreign policy, but what is significant is how individual ASEAN countries deal with the United States and other major powers, according to the experts who participated in the webinar "Asia and Trump 2.0: Geopolitical Outlooks". The webinar is organized by the Asian Center (AC), University of the Philippines.

Experts have noted how Trump's policy of raising tariffs imposed against its major trading partners like China is also affecting ASEAN as the region is also part of the China supply chain. They also cited Trump's directives such as the US withdrawal from the Paris climate pact and the World Health Organization will have repercussions worldwide. 

But while ASEAN countries are not major powers, these countries "still have agency" when it comes to international relations, according to Melissa Hubahib Loja, a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for European, Comparative, and Constitutional Legal Studies, University of Copenhagen. 

"The best way for (non-major powers) to exercise their agency is to adopt a rational approach to real politics," Loja said, noting that balancing, band wagoning and hedging are the "rational strategic options" for small states. 

Collin Koh Swee Lean, senior fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, cited Singapore as a case study in 6 strategic hedging. 

Koh said the city-state, a small and trade-dependent economy, maintains a consistent and principled foreign policy when dealing with major powers like the US and China. Koh said that regional governments like ASEAN are not likely to choose sides and would instead choose to band together to assert their interest on the global stage. 

"We are likely going to see greater intra-ASEAN cooperation," he said, adding that he expects ASEAN member states to agree on more vital issues, especially on trade as US tariff hikes threaten their respective economies. Koh also sees "growing participation in regional security" by other non-US regional powers such as those in either the Pacific or Europe. 

Maria Thaemar Tana, Japan Foundation Global Japan Studies Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, University of Tokyo, said that while hedging remains ASEAN's "best strategy", its effectiveness is limited by internal divisions, weak enforcement mechanisms and growing external pressures. 

Aaron Jed Rabena, assistant professor at the Asian Center, said ASEAN countries and reduce dependence on the US in light of Trump's "unpredictable and volatile" trade and foreign policy. However, Rabena added that the strategy of each ASEAN nation also varies from time to time based on their perceived and actual threats and opportunities.

He said that while most ASEAN countries don't have a dispute with China, this is not the case with the Philippines. The Philippines currently has a defense treaty with the US and has a dispute with China over the South Sea. 

"This is quite a challenging strategic environment, but the Philippines really needs to find the right balance in its foreign policy," Rabena said.

For Noel Christian Moratilla, dean of the Asian Center, "neutrality is what is imperative and applicable at this point". He said that this has already happened in the past, with the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 at the height of the Cold War. 

Moratilla said there's no point for the Philippines to antagonize either the US or China and learn from other ASEAN countries "as to how they do it, and also as not to appear very adversarial and very hostile to either one of them". 

Irine Hiraswari Gayatri, senior researcher at the Research Center for Politics, National Research and Innovation Agency in Indonesia, said Indonesia is diversifying economic partnerships to reduce reliance on the US market. For example, Gayatri said Indonesia has joined BRICS, demonstrating how is widening alliances. 

She said Indonesia "maintains strategic autonomy while regulating partnerships with both China and the US."

I. Introduction

The Guantanamo Bay Detention Center, established in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, remains one of the most controversial symbols of the global War on Terror. Located on the U.S. naval base in Cuba, Guantanamo has sparked international debate due to allegations of human rights violations, legal loopholes, and its use as a political tool in American domestic affairs. This article examines Guantanamo Bay through the lens of international law and explores how successive U.S. presidents have leveraged it to navigate political landscapes at home.

II. Historical Context

Guantanamo Bay’s history as a U.S. military base dates back to 1903, but its transformation into a detention center for terrorism suspects brought it to global attention. In early 2002, the U.S. government began detaining individuals captured in Afghanistan and other regions, designating them as "unlawful combatants" to circumvent protections afforded under the Geneva Conventions. Over the years, Guantanamo has become a focal point for debates on the balance between security and human rights.

III. International Law Perspective

Legal Frameworks and Violations

International law offers robust protections for individuals, even in times of conflict. Key legal frameworks include the Geneva Conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), all of which provide fundamental rights to detainees, including protections against torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and the right to a fair trial. These instruments, which reflect the international community’s commitment to human dignity, apply even in wartime and are central to the debate surrounding Guantanamo Bay.

The Geneva Conventions, particularly the Third Geneva Convention, which deals with the treatment of prisoners of war, mandates that detainees in armed conflicts be treated humanely. It prohibits torture, degrading treatment, and demands that detainees be afforded due process, including the right to a fair trial. However, the U.S. government has argued that the detainees at Guantanamo are "unlawful combatants," a term created to exclude them from the protections of the Geneva Conventions. This legal interpretation, however, has been challenged in both U.S. and international courts, leading to key rulings such as Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), which affirmed that detainees are entitled to some protections under the Geneva Conventions.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations in 1948, affirms the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all human beings. Article 9 of the UDHR explicitly prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, while Article 10 guarantees the right to a fair and public hearing. The indefinite detention of individuals at Guantanamo Bay, without charge or trial, directly contravenes these fundamental rights. The U.S. has faced significant criticism for its failure to provide fair trials to detainees, with several detainees held for years without any formal charges being brought against them.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the U.S. ratified in 1992, also protects individuals from arbitrary detention and guarantees a fair trial, including access to legal representation and the right to contest the legality of detention. Yet, Guantanamo’s practices, including prolonged detention without charge, lack of access to legal counsel for extended periods, and the denial of habeas corpus rights, have been repeatedly condemned by human rights groups as a violation of the ICCPR.

Beyond these well-established instruments, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), ratified by the U.S. in 1994, specifically prohibits the use of torture and requires states to take effective measures to prevent such practices. Guantanamo Bay’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques, often referred to as torture by human rights organizations, stands in direct violation of this convention. The United Nations has repeatedly called for the U.S. to close the facility and end the practices that contravene its international obligations under the CAT.

Despite these legal frameworks, the U.S. has argued that Guantanamo is an exception due to its status as a military detention facility located on a foreign naval base. This argument has been challenged in various legal proceedings. In Boumediene v. Bush (2008), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that detainees at Guantanamo have the constitutional right to challenge their detention in U.S. courts, reaffirming that the U.S. cannot disregard the rule of law simply because the detention center is located outside the U.S. mainland.

Despite these rulings and international condemnation, the U.S. has continued to defend its practices at Guantanamo, arguing that the need for national security in the context of the War on Terror justifies these extraordinary measures. However, the continued operation of the detention center and the lack of accountability for the violations committed there call into question the U.S.'s commitment to upholding international law, further complicating its moral and legal standing in the global community.

In sum, the legal frameworks protecting the rights of detainees—whether through the Geneva Conventions, the UDHR, the ICCPR, or the CAT—are clear in their prohibition of arbitrary detention, torture, and the denial of due process. The ongoing violations at Guantanamo Bay represent a significant breach of these international standards and raise crucial questions about the compatibility of U.S. counterterrorism policies with international human rights law.

IV. Domestic Politics and Guantanamo Bay

A. Political Tool in U.S. Elections Guantanamo Bay has not only been a topic of legal and human rights debates but also a potent political tool in U.S. presidential elections. President Obama’s 2008 campaign included a pledge to close the facility, symbolizing a shift towards restoring U.S. adherence to international law. However, despite initial efforts, political opposition, logistical challenges, and legislative barriers stalled the closure process. The Trump administration reversed this stance, emphasizing a "tough on terrorism" approach, including the potential expansion of the detention facility. As President Biden nears the end of his administration, discussions regarding the closure of Guantanamo are ongoing, but the facility remains operational. The key question now is how the incoming Trump administration will approach the center's future.

B. Symbol of National Security Domestically, Guantanamo Bay has been presented as an essential tool for safeguarding U.S. national security. This framing resonates with a significant portion of the electorate, particularly those prioritizing counterterrorism measures over civil liberties. By keeping Guantanamo open, U.S. presidents have attempted to project strength and resolve in the face of international terrorism, while sidestepping the complexities of prosecuting detainees within the U.S. judicial system.

C. Congressional and Public Opinion Efforts to close Guantanamo Bay have faced significant resistance in Congress, where bipartisan opposition has led to legislative gridlock. Public opinion, shaped by persistent fears of terrorism, has further complicated efforts to dismantle the facility. Congressional leaders have expressed concerns that closing Guantanamo could endanger national security, while others argue that the U.S. must adhere to international human rights standards. This tension underscores the broader challenge of reconciling domestic security concerns with global legal norms.

V. Stories of Detainees

Guantanamo Bay’s legacy is not solely shaped by legal arguments and political maneuvering but also by the individual stories of those detained there. These stories illustrate the human cost of the detention policies:

• Mohamedou Ould Slahi: A Mauritanian national held at Guantanamo for 14 years without charge. His memoir, Guantánamo Diary, offers a searing account of torture and psychological abuse. Slahi’s experiences underscore the absence of due process and the consequences of relying on flawed intelligence.

• Omar Khadr: A Canadian citizen, Khadr was captured in Afghanistan at 15 years old and detained at Guantanamo for over a decade. His case drew international attention due to his age and the allegations of coercion during interrogation. After his release, Khadr's story became emblematic of the ethical challenges surrounding the detention of juveniles.

• Shaker Aamer: The last British resident held at Guantanamo, Aamer spent 14 years in detention without trial. He was eventually released in 2015, after consistently denying allegations of terrorism. Aamer’s case exemplifies the difficulties of proving guilt or innocence in a system built on secrecy and a lack of transparency.

These individual stories highlight broader issues with Guantanamo’s reliance on unreliable intelligence, the treatment of detainees, and the challenge of balancing national security with human rights.

VI. Global Perception and Diplomacy

Guantanamo Bay has severely damaged the U.S.'s reputation as a leader in upholding human rights and international law. The facility’s continued existence has strained relations with both allies and adversaries, who have criticized the U.S. for its treatment of detainees and its failure to close the detention center despite widespread international condemnation. The United Nations, the European Union, and numerous human rights organizations have called for the closure of Guantanamo, arguing that it symbolizes a disregard for the Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

For U.S. allies, particularly those in the European Union, Guantanamo represents a fundamental contradiction in American foreign policy. While the U.S. promotes democracy, freedom, and human rights abroad, its actions at Guantanamo undermine these ideals, raising concerns about U.S. credibility in international diplomatic spheres. Moreover, the continued detention of individuals without trial has prompted accusations of hypocrisy, especially as the U.S. positions itself as a global advocate for the rule of law.

Adversaries of the U.S. have leveraged Guantanamo as a propaganda tool, using it to critique American foreign policy and cast the U.S. as a violator of international norms. Terrorist groups, in particular, have cited the existence of Guantanamo as evidence of U.S. hypocrisy, which serves to further fuel anti-American sentiments. The global perception of Guantanamo Bay thus complicates U.S. diplomatic efforts, creating a significant diplomatic rift that could take years to mend.

VII. Legal and Ethical Implications

The long-term consequences of Guantanamo’s legal anomalies are profound and far-reaching. By circumventing international legal norms and the protections granted by the Geneva Conventions, the U.S. risks undermining the rule of law, both domestically and internationally. This legal exception sets a dangerous precedent for other countries, potentially encouraging them to adopt similar practices in the name of national security. The normalization of indefinite detention without charge or trial poses a grave threat to the principles of justice and accountability that should govern both U.S. and international legal systems.

Ethically, Guantanamo's practices raise serious concerns about the balance between national security and fundamental human rights. The use of torture, extraordinary rendition, and indefinite detention without trial not only violates international law but also questions the morality of such actions. As the U.S. seeks to address terrorism threats, it must grapple with the ethical dilemmas posed by these methods. The question of whether the U.S. can achieve its security goals without compromising its commitment to human rights remains one of the most pressing ethical challenges.

Furthermore, the long-term psychological and physical effects on detainees—especially those who have been held for years without charge—highlight the devastating consequences of indefinite detention. Many detainees, after being released, suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other psychological issues stemming from their mistreatment. These ethical and legal violations have far-reaching consequences, not only for those detained but also for the U.S.’s moral authority in the global arena.

VIII. The Path Forward

To align with international legal standards and restore its credibility, the U.S. must take decisive steps to either reform or close Guantanamo Bay. The continued operation of the facility, despite the growing international outcry, presents a serious challenge to the U.S.'s role as a global leader in human rights. The first and most critical step would be ensuring fair trials for the remaining detainees. This could involve transferring detainees to the U.S. for civilian trials or, where appropriate, repatriating them to their home countries.

Additionally, providing reparations for the human rights violations that have occurred at Guantanamo is essential for healing and reconciliation. This could take the form of compensation to detainees who have been wrongfully detained or subjected to torture, as well as public acknowledgment of the injustices they have suffered. The U.S. must also reaffirm its commitment to international human rights norms, not only by closing Guantanamo but also by ensuring that future counterterrorism measures comply with international law.

IX. Conclusion

Guantanamo Bay stands as a powerful symbol of the challenges faced by the U.S. in balancing national security with respect for the rule of law and international human rights standards. As a legal anomaly and political tool, it reflects the tensions inherent in navigating global security challenges. Resolving the Guantanamo dilemma requires not just policy reforms, but a profound shift in the U.S.'s approach to counterterrorism—one that places a stronger emphasis on due process, human rights, and adherence to international legal norms. The closure of Guantanamo Bay would not only restore U.S. credibility on the global stage but also reaffirm the importance of upholding the core principles of justice and dignity that underpin the international legal order.

References

1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
   Supreme Court ruling affirming that detainees at Guantanamo Bay are entitled to certain protections under the Geneva Conventions.
2. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
   Supreme Court decision extending the right of habeas corpus to detainees at Guantanamo Bay, rejecting the argument that they were beyond the reach of U.S. courts.
3. United Nations (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
   United Nations General Assembly. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights.
4. United Nations (1949). Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention).
   Available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions.
5. United Nations (1984). Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).
   Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/professional-interest/pages/cat.aspx.
6. United Nations Human Rights Office (2006). Guantanamo: The Human Cost of America's "War on Terror".
   Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2006/06/guantanamo-human-cost-americas-war-terror.
7. Amnesty International (2016). Guantanamo: A Human Rights Scandal.
   Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/01/guantanamo-a-human-rights-scandal/.
8. Slahi, Mohamedou Ould. (2015). Guantanamo Diary.
   New York: Back Bay Books.
9. Khadr, Omar. (2015). Enemy Combatant: A Canadian Soldier's Story.
   Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers.
10. Shaker Aamer. (2015). The Last Prisoner: A Memoir.
    Available at: https://www.shaker-aamer.com.
11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
    United Nations General Assembly. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/civil-political-rights.
12. Chomsky, Noam. (2006). The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo.
    Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.

As the global geopolitical order evolves towards a more multipolar framework, one of the most significant developments is the proliferation of smaller regional coalitions. These alliances, characterized by their focused and often localized nature, are increasingly regarded as essential mechanisms for countries to protect their sovereignty, pursue shared economic and security objectives, and navigate the complexities of a rapidly transforming global power structure. While traditional global institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) continue to play important roles, the formation of these smaller, region-specific groupings is becoming a defining feature of modern international relations.

Transition to Multipolarity and the Rise of Focused Alliances

The world is gradually shifting away from a unipolar global system dominated by a singular superpower toward a more multipolar order, where several regional powers exert significant influence. The theoretical framework of structural realism, particularly as articulated by Kenneth Waltz, posits that in a multipolar environment, states are more inclined to form alliances based on shared security concerns and economic interests. Smaller, more targeted coalitions allow states to focus on pressing regional challenges—such as trade, security, climate change, and infrastructure—without being overshadowed by the rivalries between global superpowers. These compact alliances offer enhanced flexibility, allowing states to respond rapidly and effectively to immediate concerns.

Southeast Asia: A Paradigm of Regional Cooperation

Southeast Asia offers a compelling illustration of the rise of focused regional alliances. Strategically situated between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the region has historically been a theater of geopolitical competition, particularly between the United States and China. Countries such as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand are compelled to balance economic partnerships with China while maintaining security ties with the United States, leading to a delicate diplomatic balancing act.

China’s rapid economic ascendancy has led many Southeast Asian nations to strengthen their engagement with Beijing, particularly through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which facilitates trade, infrastructure development, and investment. Nevertheless, these countries, despite their economic dependence on China, also maintain substantial security relationships with the U.S., as evidenced by longstanding agreements like the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and the U.S.-Thailand Security Cooperation Agreement. These arrangements ensure a U.S. military presence in the region, which serves as a counterweight to China’s expanding influence.

To navigate this complex geopolitical terrain, many Southeast Asian countries have increasingly turned to smaller, more compact groups such as the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) and the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area (CLV-DTA). These alliances address specific regional issues, including infrastructure, trade, and security, allowing countries to collaborate on critical matters without becoming embroiled in the broader geopolitical rivalry between the U.S. and China. The rise of such smaller associations underscores the region’s preference for pragmatic, issue-based cooperation, rather than broad geopolitical alignment.

The Global Phenomenon of Regional Alliances

The trend toward the formation of smaller regional groups is not confined to Southeast Asia; it is a global phenomenon. Around the world, countries are increasingly opting for these coalitions to address regional challenges without being drawn into the larger, often destabilizing, power struggles between global superpowers.

Europe: The Rise of Regional Groupings in Response to EU Challenges

In Europe, smaller alliances have gained prominence as countries seek to assert their national interests, particularly in areas where broader EU policies may not align with their priorities. Notable examples include the Visegrád Group—comprising the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia—which has taken a more assertive stance on issues such as immigration and economic integration, challenging EU consensus. Likewise, the Nordic-Baltic Alliance, which includes Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and the Baltic states, focuses on security cooperation and regional stability in response to perceived threats, particularly from Russia.

These smaller groupings enable countries to address specific challenges in a more flexible and responsive manner, which is often not feasible within the larger, more bureaucratic EU framework. The emergence of such alliances reflects the growing desire for greater autonomy and adaptability in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment.

The Middle East: Fragmentation and Regional Realignment

In the Middle East, smaller alliances have emerged in response to longstanding regional power struggles, particularly between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Abraham Accords, which saw Israel normalize diplomatic relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, represent a significant shift in the region’s geopolitical landscape, fostering cooperation in areas such as security, trade, and political alignment. Similarly, the Arab Quartet, consisting of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, was formed to counter Qatar’s growing regional influence and present a unified stance against perceived destabilizing forces.

These smaller groupings provide a mechanism for countries in the region to pursue specific geopolitical and economic interests, while mitigating the influence of external powers, such as Iran and Turkey, which often play a disruptive role in regional affairs.

Africa: Regional Cooperation as a Solution to Local Challenges

In Africa, smaller alliances such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC) have proven instrumental in addressing a range of local challenges, including conflict resolution, economic integration, and trade facilitation. These regional organizations allow member states to collaborate on security issues, promote economic growth, and manage natural resources effectively, offering solutions that are more tailored to local contexts than broader global organizations might provide.

Given the political instability, terrorism, and economic challenges facing many African states, these smaller alliances are increasingly viewed as essential for addressing the region's most pressing concerns.

Latin America: Fragmented Alliances in a Politically Diverse Region

In Latin America, political fragmentation has led to the formation of smaller alliances that reflect the region’s diverse political landscape. The Pacific Alliance, which includes Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, is primarily focused on economic integration and trade, while the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), which includes Venezuela and Bolivia, espouses anti-imperialist and socialist ideals. These groupings allow countries to pursue their respective political and economic goals, providing platforms for cooperation amid the region’s political fragmentation.
 

Asia-Pacific: Strategic Partnerships and Balancing Global Powers

In the Asia-Pacific, smaller alliances are increasingly common, as countries seek to balance relations with both regional powers and global superpowers. The Quad (United States, Japan, India, and Australia), for example, is a strategic alignment designed to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, particularly in response to China’s growing influence. Additionally, regional organizations such as the South Pacific Islands Forum provide smaller Pacific island nations with a platform to collaborate on issues such as climate change, security, and sustainable development, while managing their relationships with global powers like the U.S., China, and Australia.

The Promise and Perils of Smaller Alliances

The formation of smaller regional alliances offers significant advantages, as well as notable risks. From the perspectives of international political economy and realist theory, these alliances provide countries with the opportunity to assert their autonomy and pursue specific economic, political, or security goals without being constrained by larger, more bureaucratic organizations. They facilitate faster decision-making and more effective responses to regional challenges.

However, smaller pacts are not without their drawbacks. One of the primary concerns is the potential for regional instability. These groupings can become arenas for great power competition, particularly when external powers use them to counterbalance each other’s influence. Furthermore, smaller alliances may struggle to maintain cohesion over time, especially when member states have divergent priorities. This lack of unity can limit the effectiveness of these groupings in addressing long-term regional issues. Moreover, such alliances may marginalize countries that are excluded, leading to feelings of exclusion and inequality.

Conclusion: Smaller Regional Alliances as Catalysts in a Multipolar Global Order

The rise of smaller regional alliances is a defining feature of the emerging multipolar world order. Countries are increasingly turning to focused coalitions to address regional issues and safeguard their national interests. While these alliances present valuable opportunities for cooperation, they also carry risks of fragmentation, instability, and external interference. As the global geopolitical environment continues to evolve, smaller regional groups will play a critical role in shaping future international relations. Nations will need to navigate the delicate balance between cooperation and competition within these groupings to effectively manage the complexities of the modern world.

References;

Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Norton & Company.

Chaturvedi, S., & Singh, S. (2019). The Belt and Road Initiative and Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Challenges. Asian Economic Policy Review, 14(2), 217-233.

ASEAN Secretariat. (2020). ASEAN Regional Cooperation and Integration. Retrieved from https://asean.org

Dittmer, L., & Kim, H. J. (2020). The Rise of Smaller Alliances in Southeast Asia: Balancing China and the US. Asian Security Studies Journal, 34(1), 45-68.

Tunsjø, Ø. (2021). The Security of the Asia-Pacific Region: China’s Growing Influence and U.S. Responses. Oxford University Press.

Goldstein, A. (2005). Rising China and the East Asian Order. World Politics, 57(1), 58-97.

Sahay, R., & Jain, A. (2017). The Visegrád Group and Its Role in European Politics. Journal of European Integration Studies, 17(3), 45-63.

Rabi, N. S. (2020). Regional Cooperation in Africa: The Role of ECOWAS and the EAC in Addressing Conflicts. African Journal of Political Science, 19(2), 123-138.

Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Public Affairs.

Hirsch, A., & O’Loughlin, B. (2018). Middle East Geopolitics: Power, Politics, and Regional Alliances. Routledge.

Bajpai, K., & Raj, R. (2019). The Strategic Impact of the Quad in the Indo-Pacific. Asian Security Review, 22(4), 304-325.

World Bank. (2020). Infrastructure and Economic Development in Southeast Asia: Trends and Future Directions. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). (2021). Global Trends: Regional Power Shifts and the Rise of New Alliances. Retrieved from https://cfr.org

Political stability is truly the bottom line for national development which is the truth for every nation. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar has struggled with armed conflicts for over 70 years which is the main culprit for lag in development. Losses to the nation are still countless due to political instability. Under State Administration Council’s supervision, actions are being taken to revive NCA peace process which was initiated in 15 October, 2015. State Administration Council Chairman Prime Minister Senior General Min Aung Hlaing highlighted about the importance of prompt implementation of NCA as “As NCA was drawn by stakeholders in accord with the proposals of ethnic armed organizations, only when all walk on that way will the peaceful and tranquil State we all aspire to. Hence, it is necessary to leave a peaceful legacy for prosperity and quickly implement the peace process” as an honor of 67th Anniversary of Kayin State Day Ceremony. 

When observing Singapore’s history, one of the four Asian Tigers, it has proved a stable political environment since its independence in 1965. This advantage has boosted its leaders’ attention on development initiatives. In addition, a well-rounded education system of Singapore, nurturing skilled human resources has allowed the country to stand out as one of the most developed countries in ASEAN. This is one of the vivid evidences of how political stability can grant the country and its citizens to create as a strong nation and perform their best. 

Undeniably, political instability has brought about declining foreign direct investment inflows, the dominance of black market, the increasing rate of inflation, the problem of brain drain, the spread of fake news and misinformation, among them, the worst fact is the fear of the public. When reflecting upon, the victory of every civil war is bittersweet, especially when the victims are the citizens. If it is accepted that every civil war happens for a reason and for different perceptions, it is to be accepted that its long-term consequence is disastrous. Every civil war is indeed bloody politics. 

Nowadays, global value chain which is international production sharing has taken into place among countries. Hence, when a country lacks political stability, developing a robust economy is difficult to achieve. Investors require political, legal, economic, taxation and financial conditions to remain stable as a guarantee of their investment in any home country. Hence, it is to be aware that every action and plan taken by different armed groups conveys the favorable conditions for the motherland in meeting global demand. It is a duty to prevent the motherland from going backward in an international setting. 

As of the beginning, the implementation of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement didn’t initiate based upon 100 % trust between parties. Depended upon existing trust, agreement was made on the basis of adhering to national interests. As the strength of the nation lies within, only when all different groups cooperate, will the nation be on the development route.

IN the early days of diplomacy, nations forged their relationships through formal letters, emissaries, and discreet negotiations conducted behind closed doors. Today, however, the landscape has dramatically shifted. World leaders now convey diplomatic messages with the simplicity of a tweet, and global policy discussions unfold in real-time across social media platforms. The internet has ushered in a new era of diplomacy – often referred to as ‘Twitter diplomacy’ or ‘digital diplomacy’ – which is revolutionizing how countries interact with one another and connect with their citizens.

The Power of Twitter Diplomacy 

Consider a single tweet: 280 characters sent from a smartphone can now influence millions of people around the world in seconds. No leader has demonstrated this more dramatically than former US President Donald Trump, who used Twitter not just as a platform to communicate domestic policies but as a tool for global diplomacy.

From directly addressing North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to announcing US foreign policy decisions, Trump showed how a tweet could bypass traditional diplomatic channels, instantly shaping international discussions.

But it’s not just the US that has embraced digital diplomacy. Around the globe, leaders like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have harnessed the power of social media to connect directly with citizens and international audiences. In 2023, during the G20 Summit held in New Delhi, Modi utilized platforms like Twitter (X) and Instagram to promote India’s presidency of the G20, share key initiatives, and highlight the importance of global cooperation on issues like climate change and sustainable development. His active engagement on social media allowed him to shape narratives around India’s leadership role in addressing global challenges while fostering dialogue and collaboration among member countries.

Public Diplomacy and Crisis Management

One of the key strengths of digital diplomacy is its ability to reach not only foreign governments but also global citizens. Public diplomacy – winning the hearts and minds of people in other countries – has taken on new meaning in the digital age. Social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram are now crucial tools for embassies and government officials to promote cultural diplomacy and create positive narratives about their nations.

For instance, South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation actively uses social media to promote its cultural diversity and initiatives, engaging with global audiences through posts that highlight its rich heritage, traditional music, and significant events like the annual Nelson Mandela Day celebrations. In contrast, China utilizes platforms like Weibo to promote its Belt and Road Initiative, sharing stories of infrastructure projects and cultural exchanges. Meanwhile, Bhutan leverages social media to highlight its unique approach to Gross National Happiness, sharing insights into its cultural values and sustainable development efforts, fostering goodwill and understanding through shared cultural experiences.

In times of crisis, social media can also serve as an essential tool for diplomatic communication. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Health Organization and various government officials used platforms like Twitter to coordinate international responses and provide timely updates on health guidelines. Similarly, in the aftermath of natural disasters or terrorist attacks, social media allows governments to disseminate information, request aid, or offer assistance quickly.

The Hazards and Hurdles

Nevertheless, for all its advantages, social media also introduces significant risks to the world of diplomacy. One of the most pressing concerns is the spread of misinformation and disinformation. Fake news can inflame conflicts, deepen misunderstandings, and even destabilize governments. A significant example occurred during the conflict between Israel and Hamas in 2021 when misinformation circulated on social media about the events leading to the violence.

False narratives and misleading images were shared widely, inflaming tensions and polarizing opinions internationally. This misinformation complicated diplomatic efforts by various countries seeking to mediate the conflict, illustrating how social media can quickly escalate diplomatic crises and hinder constructive dialogue in sensitive geopolitical situations.

Another challenge is the informal and often unpredictable nature of digital diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy is built on careful negotiation and tact, but social media allows for impulsive, unfiltered statements that can escalate tensions. A single tweet can lead to diplomatic fallout if misinterpreted or seen as inflammatory. In an era where world leaders have instant access to millions of followers, a moment of poor judgment can have far-reaching consequences.

Shaping Global Opinions and Soft Power

While challenges persist, the capacity of social media to influence international relations is profound. For instance, during the negotiations surrounding the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) in 2015, social media became a battleground for narratives. Key diplomats, including US Secretary of State John Kerry, utilized platforms like Twitter to provide real-time updates and to counter misinformation about the negotiations. This online engagement allowed for greater transparency and helped to rally support from both domestic and international audiences. Furthermore, after the deal was reached, social media was instrumental in disseminating messages of hope and collaboration, as well as in addressing concerns from sceptics in various countries. This example highlights how social media can serve as a vital tool in diplomacy, shaping perceptions and facilitating dialogue during critical negotiations.

The Next Chapter of Diplomacy in a Digital Era As social media continues to evolve, so too will the nature of diplomacy. Future diplomats will need to master not just the art of negotiation but the skill of digital communication. Social media platforms will increasingly become critical arenas for public diplomacy, crisis management, and even negotiations.

On the other hand, the world must also consider the need for international laws and diplomatic protocols to keep up with the pace of digital change. What measures can be taken to ensure world leaders’ responsible online communication? How can the spread of misinformation be controlled without infringing on free speech? As digital diplomacy becomes more entrenched in global politics, these are questions that will need answers.

Conclusion

Diplomacy in the digital age is fast, direct, and powerful. Social media has transformed global politics, creating new opportunities for engagement and new risks. Leaders now have the power to shape international relations with the click of a button, and the world is watching. In this rapidly changing landscape, diplomacy will need to adapt, ensuring that even in the digital age, dialogue and cooperation remain at the heart of international relations.

Refs:

• Cohen, E (2019). Digital Diplomacy: The Impact of Social Media on International Relations. Routledge.

• Bachmann, A, & Weber, R (2018). “The Role of Social Media in Shaping International Relations.” International Studies Quarterly, 62 (2), 283-295.

• Gilboa, E (2019). “The Impact of Social Media on Diplomacy: From Information to Action.” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 14 (2), 178-201.

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Source- The Global New Light of Myanmar